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STEALTH PREEMPTION: THE PROPOSED FEDERALIZATION
OF STATE COURT PROCEDURES
WENDY

I.

P

E.

PARMET*

INTRODUCTION

RESUMABLY this is the era of devolution, a time of renewed recogni-

tion of the role of states as independent political entities. In concert
with this recognition of the importance of states' rights, congressional
leaders have both extolled the advantages of empowering the states and
avoiding the centralization of authority in Washington.1 The Supreme
Court, too, has acknowledged the advantages of maintaining states' authority and has continually supported Congress' endorsement of states'
2
rights.
Despite this professed concern for the interests of states, federal legislators increasingly have proposed and endorsed bills that would regulate
the procedures employed by state courts. At first glance, these proposals
appear to forgo traditional preemption and allow state courts to resolve
disputes under the substantive rules determined by state common law; in
reality, however, the respect these proposals give to state courts is highly
deceptive. These proposals would actually limit the procedures state
courts can use and impose significant financial and political costs on state
courts. 3 By altering the relationships between state courts and both the
federal courts and Congress, these proposed bills would raise grave constitutional questions.
This Article explores both the wisdom and constitutionality of such
proposals to federalize state court procedures and focuses significantly on
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University Law School. Support for this
work was provided by Grant Award No. ROI CA67805-01 from the National
Institutes of Health/National Cancer Institute. The author wishes to thankJudith
Olans Brown, Patricia Davidson, Richard Daynard and Peter Enrich for their
helpful review and criticism, Lara Sutherlin and John Pelletier for their research
help and Elsie Man for her secretarial support.
1. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 3-7 (Ed Gillespie
& Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTRACT WITH AMERICA] (discussing
367 Republican candidates' contract to reform federal government and devolve
power).
2. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's endorsement of states'
rights, see infra notes 201-64 and accompanying text.
3. For a further discussion of the impact of federal proposals on state courts,
see infra notes 265-324 and accompanying text.
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the 1997 proposed global settlement of tobacco liability claims, a proposal
noted for the extent of its regulation of state court procedures. 4 Although
this particular proposal now appears defeated, the debate over tobacco
regulation continues.5 It remains critical that any future federal regulation of tobacco, or any other product or service, is analyzed for its effect
on state courts.
To begin the analysis, Part II reviews the specific terms of the proposed tobacco settlement as an example of a plan to federalize state tort
law. 6 Additionally, Part II gives a brief and necessarily incomplete history
of federal control over state courts and considers several other recent proposals to federalize state court procedures. 7 Part III addresses constitutional issues and considers whether Congress has the power to regulate
state court procedures. 8 This analysis requires a discussion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause of Article I, as well as the relationship established between the state and federal courts under the
Supremacy Clause and Article III. 9 Part III also considers the potential
limitations upon federal authority established by the Tenth Amendment
4. See Proposed Resolution, June 20, 1997 (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://
stic.neu.edu/setdement/6-20-settle.htm> [hereinafter Tobacco Proposal] (documenting proposed tobacco settlement).
5. See National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act, S. 1415,
105th Cong. (1998) (embodying proposed global tobacco settlement). In the
spring of 1998, Senator McCain introduced an amended version of Senate Bill

1415 to the Senate floor for consideration. Claiming that the proposed legislation
departed from the terms of the original settlement, tobacco manufacturers withdrew their support. See David E. Rosenbaum, Tobacco Strategy, When No Means Yes,
and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, § 4, at 5 [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Tobacco
Strategy] (stating that cigarette companies found tobacco legislation unacceptable
and withdrew from negotiations).
On June 17, 1998, the Senate, after almost a month of debate, killed the bill.
See David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Drops Tobacco Bill with '98 Revival Unlikely; Clinton
Lashes Out at G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Rosenbaum,
Senate Drops Tobacco Bill] (reporting that Senate jettisoned broad smoking legislation). Former Speaker Gingrich, however, promised that the House would again
consider a tobacco bill. See David E. Rosenbaum, Gingrich Promises to Offer a New,
Simpler Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1998, at A24 [hereinafter Rosenbaum,
Gingrich Promises] (stating that Gingrich plans to put forward "low-budget alternative" to Senate bill). This past fall, however, in the absence of any federal regulation, the tobacco industry reached a settlement with state attorneys general. This
settlement does not purport to affect the claims of individuals and classes of plaintiffs that would have been regulated by the original federal proposal. See Barry
Meier, Remaining States Approve the Pact on Tobacco Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998,
at Al [hereinafter Meier, Tobacco Suits].
6. For a further discussion of the specific terms of the proposed tobacco settlement, see infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of the history of federal control over the state
courts and other recent proposals dealing with the issue of federalism, see infra
notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of Congress' power to regulate state court procedures, see infra notes 70-339 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of Congress' regulation of state court procedures
under the Constitution, see infra notes 70-264 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/1

2

Parmet: Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Pr

1999]

STEALTH PREEMPTION

and the claim that Congress may regulate state court procedures pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 concluding that the settlement's proposal may well have exceeded Congress' constitutional
authority."'
The analysis does not end with the constitutional discussion. Over
the years, the Supreme Court has recognized that "Our Federalism" demands sensitivity to the role and institutional structure of the state courts,
even when the federal Constitution does not explicitly limit the federal
role. 12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been particularly hesitant to endorse federal review or usurpation of state judicial procedures. Part IV
considers how numerous doctrines grounded in notions of comity caution
against the careless federalization of state court procedures.1 3 Although
these doctrines neither decide the constitutional issue nor speak to the
reach of explicit congressional actions, they do present compelling reasons for cautious deliberation before tinkering with the delicate balance of
judicial federalism. Finally, Part V concludes that recent proposals to federalize state court procedures are deeply troubling precisely because of
their subtlety and complexity. 14 If Congress wishes to federalize an area, it
would be far better to do so by enacting substantive federal laws. Stealth
preemption, though less visible than substantive preemption, is far more
destructive of our political system, precisely because it is so invisible and
little understood.
II.

PROPOSALS TO FEDERALIZE STATE COURT PROCEDURES

A.

The Proposed Tobacco Settlement

In the summer of 1997, tobacco industry representatives and the attorneys general of several states entered into talks designed to resolve outstanding state claims against tobacco companies.' 5 As the discussions
proceeded, the parties began to consider a global settlement that would
have resolved issues far beyond those at stake in the particular litigation in
10. For a further discussion of the limitations over Congress' authority under

the Constitution, see infra notes 184-339 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of Congress' authority to limit state court procedures under the Constitution, see infra notes 265-324 and accompanying text.
12. SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (commenting that "Our
Federalism" was "born in the early struggling days of our Union" and represents "a
system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments" and "in which the National Government... always endeavors [to act] in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the states").
13. For a further discussion of doctrines that caution against the careless federalization of state court procedures, see infra notes 340-86 and accompanying
text.
14. For the conclusion of this Article, see infra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
15. See Daniel Givelber, CigaretteLaw, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 867 (1998) (discussing
history of tobacco litigation).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. I

which the parties were engaged. 16 Such a settlement, it was understood,
17
could only take effect via federal legislation.
The fact that the settlement displayed some sensitivity to the interests
and concerns of the states is not surprising given the settlement's genesis
in talks initiated by the state attorneys general. Indeed, in some ways, the

settlement was a model of "cooperative federalism," crafting interlocking
roles for both state and federal authorities. The proposed settlement acknowledged that tobacco products are "sold, marketed, advertised and distributed in interstate commerce on a nationwide basis, and have a
substantial effect on the nation's economy." 18 Accordingly, the proposal
envisioned an active federal regulatory rule, most particularly by clarifying,
and in some respects limiting, the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 19 Recognizing the traditional role of the states in the
regulation of tobacco products, the proposal called for enforcement of its
restrictions on tobacco sales and advertising by both the federal government and the states. 20 More relevant for current purposes, the proposal
would have vested both state and federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings to enforce tobacco control laws, except that all proceedings not "exclusively local in nature" would have been removable to
21
federal court.
16. See id. at 867 n.2 (considering settlement that would reach far beyond
current litigation).
17. SeeJohn M. Broder, Political Costs Are Clouding Tobacco Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1997, at Al (stating that congressional and presidential .approval was
needed on tobacco settlement issues regarding restriction of individuals' right to
recover punitive damages and manner in which compensatory payments from cigarette companies should be divided); John Schwartz, In Tobacco Suits, States Find
Strength in Numbers: Mississippi Attorney General Rallies Coalition of Colleagues in
Landmark Legal Battle, WASH. POST, May 18, 1997, at A6 (same).
18. Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 4.
19. See id. at 8-26 (discussing scope of jurisdiction of federal agency under
proposed settlement).
20. See id. at 26 (discussing effect of proposal regulating tobacco products on
traditional role of states in regulating tobacco industry). The proposal, howe~er,
would have prohibited the states from enforcing obligations or requirements beyond those imposed by the legislation (except where the legislation does not specifically preempt additional state-law obligations). See Peter D. Enrich & Patricia
A. Davidson, Local and State Powers Under the Proposed Tobacco Settlement,
Working Paper #1 in a Series on Legal Issues in the Proposed Tobacco Settlement
(July 31, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter
Parmet, Working Paper #1 ].
21. See Tobacco Proposal supra note 4, at 26. For a further discussion of this
provision, see Wendy E. Parmet, JudicialFederalism and the Proposed Tobacco Settlement, Working Paper #3 in a Series on Legal Issues in the Proposed Tobacco Settlement,
TOBACCO CONTROL REsOURCE CENTER, Aug. 6, 1997 [hereinafter Parmet, Working
Paper #3]. To the extent that local enforcement actions would have been permitted under the proposal, it would appear to have permitted defendants to remove
state enforcement actions brought under state law to federal court. See id. at 2-3. If
diversity was lacking in such actions, the basis for federal Article III jurisdiction
would not have been immediately apparent. See id. In addition, because the removal provision would have allowed individual defendants to remove a case
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Despite this apparent recognition of and respect for the traditional
role of the states with respect to tort law, a closer examination of the proposal's civil liability provisions reveals a disturbing attempt to interfere
with the ability of state courts to enforce their own laws. 22 The proposal
did not attempt to alter significantly the substantive tort standards applicable in actions against tobacco companies or to preempt state tort actions. 23 Although Congress could have taken these more drastic measures
under its authority to regulate interstate commerce, the proposal would
have interfered with or regulated state court actions in more subtle, or
stealth, ways. 24 Most importantly, the proposal would have prohibited, absent a defendant's consent, class actions,joinder of parties, aggregation of
claims, consolidations, extrapolations or other devices states might use to
25
resolve cases other than individual trials.

Given the expense and complexity of tobacco litigation, this prohibition on the consolidation of claims would undoubtedly have rendered
26
many cases against tobacco companies economically unsustainable.
Thus, while ostensibly regulating the applicable procedures, the proposal
would inevitably have had a significant effect on the states' realization of
substantive rights. 27 Additional barriers to the realization of those rights

would also have resulted from a provision of the proposal stating that a
brought by the state to federal court, there were also possible Eleventh Amendment problems. See id. at 3. Although these judicial federalism problems are not
dissimilar to those discussed below, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
22. For a discussion of the federalism issues raised by some of the other provisions in the proposal, see Parmet, Working Paper #3, supra note 21, at 3, 10.
23. See Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 39. The proposal would have had a
substantive impact by barring punitive damages and limiting all liability under a
global cap. See id. Assuming that tobacco may be regulated under the Commerce
Clause, this provision raised questions primarily under the Fifth Amendment. The
major question, in effect, was whether Congress would violate an individual's due
process rights by limiting punitive damages. See A Review of the Global Tobacco Settlement: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,105th Cong. 158 (1997) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School)
(supporting proposition that Fifth Amendment would not prohibit congressional
linitation of punitive damages).
24. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to regulate interstate
commerce). Although the Supreme Court has read the Commerce Clause more
narrowly in recent years, as evidenced by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
there is little doubt that regulation of the tobacco industry falls within the purview
of the Commerce Clause. For a further discussion of the regulation of the tobacco
industry under the Commerce Clause, see infra notes 102-04 and accompanying
text.
25. See Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 39 (discussing effect of proposal).
26. See Richard A. Daynard & John Rumpler, Changes to the CivilJustice System
Under the Proposed Tobacco Settlement, Working Paper#4 in a Series on Legal Issues in the
Proposed Tobacco Settlement, TOBACCO CONTROL RESOURCE CENTER, Aug. 13, 1997, at
5 [hereinafter Daynard & Rumpler, Working Paper #4] (discussing effect of prohibition of claim consolidation).
27. See Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv.
211, 299 (1992) (arguing that procedural rules are not value-neutral).
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defendant could remove a civil liability case to federal court "upon receipt
of application to, or order of, state court providing for trial or other procedure in violation of this provision." 28 Despite maintaining the right of
individuals to sue in state court under state tort theories, the proposal
sought to dictate the procedural format of such cases and permit defendants to remove actions to federal court when state courts failed to abide by
the federal procedural prohibitions. The result of this procedural limitation would have been an extensive federalization of state court procedures
applicable to actions decided primarily under state law. Such an innovation in "cooperative federalism" would have disrupted the orderly administration of state court cases, as well as the critical balance our Constitution
maintains between federal authority and state sovereignty. 29
One year later, the original settlement appears to have died. Several
modified versions of the original proposal were introduced in the 105th
Congress.30 An initial version of the National Tobacco Policy and Youth
Smoking Reduction Act,31 introduced by Senator McCain, was voted out
of the Senate's Commerce Committee.3 2 As reported to the floor, the
amended bill avoided stealth preemption and opted for a more direct and
traditional form of preemption, deeming all tobacco liability actions to be
federal actions.33 The tobacco industry, claiming that the McCain bill violated the original deal and would raise cigarette taxes excessively, with35
drew its support.3 4 After lengthy debate, the Senate killed the bill.
Despite the proposal's apparent demise, Congress may eventually revisit
the issue. Whether provisions federalizing state court procedures will appear in future versions of tobacco legislation is still uncertain.

28. See Tobacco Proposal supra note 4, at 39 (commenting on additional barriers to realization of state substantive rights).
29. For a further discussion of the proposal's impact on state tort actions, see
infra notes 317-24 and accompanying text.
30. See Placing Restraints on Tobacco's Endangerment of Children and Teens
Act, S. 1530, 105th Cong. (1997) (embodying elements of proposed tobacco settlement); National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act, S. 1415, 105th
Cong. (1998) (same).
31. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1998).
32. See id. (discussing initial bill proposed by Senator McCain).
33. See Richard A. Daynard & Wendy E. Parmet, Judicial Federalism and Civil
Liability Provisions of the McCain Committee Bill (S. 1415), Working Paper #8 in a
Series on Legal Issues in the Proposed Tobacco Settlement (May 11, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Daynard & Parmet, Working Paper#8] (discussing effect of Senate Bill 1415's preemption provisions on state
court claims).
34. See Rosenbaum, Tobacco Strategy, supra note 5, at 5 (commenting on federal nature of tobacco liability actions).
35. See Rosenbaum, Senate Drops Tobacco Bil4 supra note 5, at Al (reporting
Senate veto of tobacco bill).
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B.

Other Proposalsto Federalize State Court Procedures

Although the proposed tobacco settlement is unusual in the extent of
its suggested regulation of state court procedures, it is not without precedent.3 6 Congress has long regulated the procedures applicable when state
courts adjudicate federal causes of action.3 7 The more recent innovation
has been the regulation of procedures to be used in state causes of
38
action.
One of the earliest examples of such legislation is the federal Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. 39 The act sets forth the conditions by which
foreign sovereigns will have immunity in actions brought in state and federal courts. 40 The act does not simply create a federal defense for foreign
sovereigns, but instead sets forth the procedures by which notice shall be
given and service of process and answers filed in all actions against foreign
sovereigns in federal and state courts. 4 1 While the act directly controls the
procedures applicable in state courts, the courts have not yet examined
whether Congress has the authority to directly impose federal procedures
42
on state courts in this manner.
Further congressional intrusion into state court procedures can be
found in the more recent National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.4 3 This
44
act provides a program for compensation of vaccine-related injuries.
The main part of the act creates a federal vaccine compensation program. 45 The act also specifies the manner in which civil trials in state
36. For a further discussion of the proposed tobacco settlement and its impact on state court procedures, see supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text. In
contrast to the proposed tobacco settlement, all of the statutes enacted thus far
arguably impose federal procedures in close connection to the adjudication of federal issues arising in state law claims. The regulation of state procedures in the
tobacco settlement, in contrast, would have occurred in the virtual absence of any
federal substantive issue.
37. For a further discussion of Congress' regulation of state court procedures,
see infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
38. For a further discussion of the regulation of procedures to be used in
state causes of action, see infra notes 39-69 and accompanying text.
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
40. See id. § 1604.
41. See id. § 1608.
42. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 31-33 (1984) (suggesting that
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994), as interpreted by majority, would impose federal procedures on state courts). The Southland majority,
however, found that the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law." See id. at
12 (noting that substantive law created by FAA was applicable in both state and
federal court). From the Southland majority's perspective, the FAA does not federalize state courts' procedures-it merely preempts state actions subject to its purview. See id. at 8-9. For a further discussion of Southland, see infra notes 290-96 and
accompanying text.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 34 (1994).
44. See id. § 300aa-10 ("There is established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program . . . under which compensation may be made for a vaccinerelated injury or death.").
45. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. I

courts may proceed against vaccine manufacturers. 46 Presumably such trials would continue to "arise under" state law and rely heavily on state tort
47
law principles for their substantive content.
In some ways, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act is representative of several recently considered tort reform proposals that would regulate state court procedures. 48 Like these more recent proposals, the act
was designed to respond to a perceived "tort crisis." 49 Supporters of the
act claimed that such a "crisis". threatened the economic viability of an
industry. 50 Responding to the perception of a liability crisis, Congress created a compensation board and regulated both the substance and some of
the procedures that would apply in state courts.
The perception of a tort crisis, especially with respect to "mass torts,"
has been widespread in the last ten years. In 1991, the tort crisis received
public attention when Vice President Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness cited the civil justice system as one of the chief impediments to
the nation's ability to compete globally. 51 To rectify the situation, the
Council proposed a set of judicial reforms. The particular procedural reforms suggested, however, were apparently directed only at the federal
courts.

52

46. See id. § 300aa-23 (setting forth procedures for civil trials).
47. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that federal law neither explicitly nor implicitly preempts traditional state

products liability law). Federal law does, however, preempt certain aspects of such
cases. See, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 527 (N.J. 1989) (holding
that act limits state tort claims based on injury arising after effective date of compensation program and creates presumption that vaccine's warning was valid if it
complied with FDA requirements).
48. For a further discussion of tort reform proposals that would regulate state
court procedures, see infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
49. See Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 941, 953 (1995) (discussing perceived tort crisis as it applies to
mass torts).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 6-7 (1986) (summarizing background and
need for National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act). In its report, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commented:
Lawsuits and settlement negotiations ...

[have] been ineffective for the

manufacturers of childhood vaccines. This has become especially true as
the number of lawsuits.., has increased .... [T] here is little doubt that
vaccine manufacturers face great difficulty in obtaining [product liability]
insurance ....
This factor, coupled with the possibility that vaccine-injured persons may recover substantial awards in tort claims, has
prompted manufacturers to question their continued participation in the
vaccine market.
Id.
51. See Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness'sAgenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992) (critiquing Council's proposal to reform civil justice system).
52. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, A PLAN TO IMPROVE
AMERICA'S CIVIL SYSTEM OF CIVILJUSTICE 1-3 (National Legal Center for the Public

Interest 1992) [hereinafter

COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS]

(directing reform pro-

posal at federal procedure, not state procedure).
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In 1994, the American Law Institute (ALI) issued its long-awaited report on complex litigation. 53 The report dealt directly with the problems
associated with mass torts.5 4 The report also noted that federal reform
raised serious federalism issues because most complex tort cases do not
arise under federal law. 55 Responding to the federalism issue, the report
advocated unique federal intervention in state courts' systems. 56 The
study suggested that Congress authorize a proposed federal complex litigation panel to designate a state court as a transferee forum to adjudicate
consolidated complex cases. 57 The ALI also suggested that to obtain jurisdiction over these complex, multi-state cases, state courts should retain
nationwide service of process. 58 Recognizing the potential problems associated with the proposal's federalization of state jurisdiction and procedure, the study noted that "federalism concerns are addressed by
predicating consolidation in state court upon the consent of the designated state's judicial authority on a case-by-case basis." 59 The study further suggested that Congress can provide for nationwide service of process
under the commerce power as long as it acts within the confines of the
60
Fifth Amendment.
Congress never enacted the ALI's proposals. In the years since the
report, however, several bills proposing to regulate state court procedures
in state law actions have been introduced. 6 1 For example, the Product
Liability Fairness Act of 199362 would have created a procedure for offers
of judgment to be applied in state court products liability actions. 6 3 A
53. See COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALysis
WITH REPORTER'S STUDY (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION].
54. See id. at 3 (stating purpose of complex litigation project).
55. See id. at 305 (describing complex litigation as involving "areas historically
governed by state law").
56. See id. at 36 (proposing federal intrasystem consolidation and transfer).
57. See id. at 177 (discussing results of American Law Institute (ALI) study).
58. See id. at 192 (analyzing needs for and scope of state court jurisdiction).
59. Id. at 174. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988) [hereinaf-

ter Merritt, Federalism] (discussing that state consent may not obviate federalism
problem).
60. See COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 53, at 198.
61. For examples of bills proposing to regulate state court procedures, see
infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
62. S. 687, 103d Cong. (1993).
63. See id; see also Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S.648, 105th Cong.
(1997) (limiting punitive damages in state tort actions and imposing detailed procedural restrictions on such damage awards). For a further discussion of the con-

stitutionality of the Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, see Jeffrey White, Does
Products Bill Collide with Tenth Amendment?, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 30, 30-35. The most
recent products liability proposal focused on limiting punitive damages and creat-

ing some nationwide substantive defenses. See Product Liability Reform Act of
1998, S.2236, 105th Cong. (1998). The Product Liability Reform Act of 1998 apparently died in the Senate on July 9,1998. See Neil A. Lewis, Senate Dims Hope for
Liability Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Al.
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similar bill, the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1995,64
would have created a complex set of procedures for state courts to follow
prior to awarding punitive damages in state tort actions. 6 5 This bill passed
both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Clinton. 66 Similar
attempts to federalize state tort procedure are evident in the Securities
67
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997 ("Securities Reform Act"),
68
which recently passed the Senate, but still has yet to pass the House.
Like the tobacco settlement, this bill would have prohibited state courts
from entertaining some class actions in litigation brought under state laws
in state courts.
These proposals were designed to address different problems and the
particular procedures that the proposals affected vary, but common to
each proposal was an attempt to regulate how state courts manage the
resolution of state law issues. In each case, the drafter decided that there
was an issue of national scope that required federal attention. Rather than
preempting state substantive law or creating an exclusive federal remedy,
however, the drafter instead proposed to leave the state courts as the chief,
if not sole, arbiters of the issue and to leave states as the primary source of
substantive law. 69 At first glance, the federal role in the regulation of state
court procedure appears to have been kept to a minimal level, but while
the drafters of these proposals would no doubt claim that they made their
choices out of respect for states, further reflection suggests that the particular type of federal intrusion envisioned, although more subtle than outright preemption, may be especially onerous for the states. Moreover,
such stealth preemption is of questionable constitutionality.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERALIZATION OF STATE
COURT PROCEDURES

A.

The Testa Doctrine

To a limited degree, Congress has controlled the jurisdiction and procedures employed in state courts since the beginning of the republic. The
Federalist Papers noted that Article III itself, in granting Congress control
64. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995).
65. See id. § 108; see also Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Product Liability Reform, WarningNot Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REv. 665, 667 (1997) (analyzing constitutionality of House Bill 956).
66. SeeJohn F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes ProductLiability Measure;Move Triggers Barrage of Accusations Between White House and Republicans,WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at
A14 (tracking status of bill).
67. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
68. See id. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("Securities Reform Act") was approved by the Senate on May 13, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S4815
(daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). The House version of the
bill is House Bill 1689. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
69. See Betsy J. Gray, Make Congress Speak Clearly: FederalPreemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 563-64 (1997) (discussing whether and how Congress
can preempt substantive tort law).
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over the creation of lower federal courts and their jurisdiction, implicitly
authorized Congress to rely upon state courts to carry out the federal judicial business. 70 Acting upon that authority, in the early nineteenth century, Congress often gave specific grants ofjurisdiction to the state courts
and incidentally regulated the procedures that went along with those
grants. 71 In 1815, for example, Congress gave state or county courts jurisdiction over disputes involving federal taxes and nullified the operation of
any state laws pertaining to service of process in relationship to tax actions
72
brought by the United States in state courts.
This federal practice of relying upon state courts to execute federal
judicial business was challenged by the Supreme Court's opinion in Prigg
v.Pennsylvania.73 Priggreflected a "separate spheres" vision of federalism
that was incompatible with the common reliance upon state courts for the
enforcement of federal law. Prigg's vision of federalism, however, did not
survive the Civil War and Reconstruction and their realignment of federal
and state power. In fact, only in the aftermath of the Reconstruction did
the Supreme Court clearly articulate the basis for congressional influence
over the jurisdiction of the state courts.
In Claflin v. Houseman,74 the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether assignees in bankruptcy could sue in state court. 75 Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley noted that the sovereignties are "distinct,
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 4-5 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (maintaining state court authority over substantive law). Alexander
Hamilton stated in FederalistNo. 82 that:
This might either be construed to signify, that the supreme and
subordinate courts of the Union should alone have the power of deciding
those causes to which their authority is to extend; or simply to denote...
that the United States should exercise the judicial power with which they
are to be invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number
of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. [T]he last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals; ...

and... appears ... the most

natural and defensible construction.
Id.; see Saikrishna Banglore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957,
1961 (1993) (considering question of whether this allows Congress to "constitute"
state courts as lower federal courts); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal
Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in JudicialFederalism,60 HARv. L. REv. 966,
967 (1947) [hereinafter Utilizationof State Courts] (stating that proponents of states'
rights assumed state courts would operate in capacity of lower federal tribunals).
71. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370-72 (1997) (detailing some
of these enactments that granted jurisdiction to state courts).
72. See Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 244, 244-45 (providing state or
county courts with collection districts for collection of direct tax or internal duties
of United States, cognisance of all complaints, suits and prosecutions for taxes,
duties, fines, penalties and forfeitures arising and payable under any of acts passed
or to be passed and jurisdiction over any sum in controversy attaching to cases
under acts or acts to be passed).
73. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 563 (1842).
74. 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
75. See id. at 133 (discussing whether assignee in bankruptcy can sue in state
court).
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and neither can interfere with the proper jurisdiction of the other ....
[b]ut this is no reason why the State courts should not be open for the
prosecution of rights growing out of the laws of the United Sates, to which
their jurisdiction is competent, and not denied." 76 Justice Bradley ex'77
plained that the "laws of the United States are laws in the several States."
He noted the Framers' assumption that state courts would retain their
general jurisdiction and would exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal claims, except when Congress explicitly divested
them of that jurisdiction. 78 Justice Bradley concluded by surveying the
many times that Congress had in fact relied upon state courts to adjudi79
cate federal claims.
By the start of the twentieth century, Congress began again to rely
upon state courts to implement federal regulatory authority. In a series of
cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 80 the
Court asserted that the Supremacy Clause demands that state courts of
general jurisdiction exercise their jurisdiction for claims brought under
FELA. 8 1 This principle was solidified in 1947 in Testa v. Katt,82 a case
brought by a buyer in a Rhode Island state court under the federal Emergency Price Control Act. 83 The Rhode Island court refused to entertain
the federal claim, on the ground that a state need not enforce the penal
laws of another sovereign. 84 Writing for the Court, Justice Black rejected
76. Id. at 137.
77. Id. at 136.
78. See id. at 138.
79. See id.

80. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
81. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (stating that
power of states to determine limits of jurisdiction of their courts is subject to restrictions imposed by federal Constitution); see also Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55-58 (1912) (stating that state courts are bound
to recognize laws of United States and must exercise jurisdiction conferred upon
them by statute). But see Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 38788 (1929) (stating that court need not hear federal claim when subject matter
otherwise would not fall within its jurisdiction).
82. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
83. Pub. L. No. 420, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1946). Section 925(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act provided that a buyer of goods above the prescribed ceiling price could sue the seller "in any court of competent jurisdiction" for not more
than three times the amount of the overcharge plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. See id. § 925(e). Section 925(c) provided that federal district courts
should have jurisdiction of such suits "concurrently with State and Territorial
courts." See id. § 925(c). Such a suit under section 925(e) was required to be
brought "in the district or county in which the defendant resides or has a place of
business." Id.
84. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 388. The Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted
section 205(e) to be a penal statute in the international sense and thus not enforceable in state courts. See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 313 (R.I. 1946) (reversing
superior court decision on basis of lack of jurisdiction concerning foreign penal
laws), rev'd, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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Rhode Island's argument. 85 Relying heavily upon Claflin and the earlier
FELA cases, Justice Black noted that when the state court had general jurisdiction over the type of claim raised, it could not refuse the claim
merely because it derives from the federal government.8 6
The Testa doctrine thus solidified the complex and interconnected
relationship between the state and federal courts by noting that federal
and state jurisdictions are not entirely distinct. The Supremacy Clause

speaks explicitly to state judges who maintain implicit general jurisdiction
over federal claims.8 7 Hence, Congress can require state courts of general
jurisdiction to hear federal claims and, furthermore, state courts may not
refuse federal claims simply because of their federal derivation. 8
Testa and similar cases, however, did not consider the ability of Congress to influence the procedures applied in state courts in claims derived
from state law. Rather, Testa and its kin only explicated that Congress
could rely upon state courts of general jurisdiction to adjudicate federal
claims. 89 The question of whether Congress could regulate state court
procedures remained open.

B.

Article III: The StartingPoint

The starting place for any analysis of Congress' ability to regulate the
procedures state courts use in state actions must be Article 111.90 Article
III derives from a compromise between those Framers who urged the creation of federal trial courts and those who believed that judicial business
85. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392 (providing reasoning of Justice Black). Justice
Black was not persuaded by Rhode Island's argument that its established policy
against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States
that it deems penal was a valid excuse against enforcement of these statutes. See id.
(refuting argument by State of Rhode Island).
86. See id. at 393 (stating that court cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction arising from United States law because of doubts of congressional wisdom).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Constitution states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof;, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. For a further discussion of the proposition that Congress can generally require
state courts to hear federal claims, see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
88. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392 (holding that when Congress speaks, it speaks for
all states).
89. See generally Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (asserting that
obligation of states to enforce federal laws is not lessened by reason of form in
which they are cast or remedy that they provide).
90. See Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress Over Courts in Nonfederal Cases,
1995 BYU L. Ruv. 731, 737 (discussing national power -to confer jurisdiction on
state courts over cases that do not arise under federal law).
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should remain with the states. 9 1 As a result, the compromise granted Congress the authority to institute lower federal courts, leaving implicit the
assumption that state courts would remain open to federal business. This
understanding was made explicit by Alexander Hamilton in his famous
discussion of the issue in Federalist No. 82:
[B]ut I hold that the State courts will be divested of no part of
their primitive jurisdiction further than may relate to an appeal;
and I am even of opinion that in every case in which they were
not expressly excluded by future acts of the national legislature,
they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those
acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary
92
power and from the general genius of the system.
That state courts would inevitably hear and consider federal claims
was also evident from the so-called 'judges clause" in the Supremacy
Clause. 93 That clause speaks not only to the preeminence of federal law, it
also obligates state judges to adhere to that law, notwithstanding state
laws. 94 It is this constitutional insistence that state courts hear federal is95
sues and be bound by federal law that underlies both Claflin and Testa.
These cases and their progeny stand for the proposition that in our federal system state courts are obliged to apply and follow constitutionally
valid federal law.
These cases do not, however, determine whether a particular federal
enactment, which state courts are asked to apply, is otherwise within the
scope of congressional authority. Thus, while the Testa doctrine makes
clear that state courts of general jurisdiction must be open to and cannot
discriminate against valid federal laws, the doctrine does not explain when
a federal law is otherwise valid. The shortcomings of the Testa doctrine
are illustrated by the example of a federal law requiring state courts to
dismiss civil actions against "any Catholic living in the state." Despite
Testa, such a federal law, although within the scope of Article III, would
not be valid, for it would violate both the First and Fifth Amendments. For
the federal regulation of state court procedures to be constitutional, the
regulation must be authorized by a valid source of congressional authority
96
and not be otherwise unconstitutional.
91. See HART & WESCHLESER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 5
(Paul M. Bator et al. eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS] (noting
divergent views in development and structure of federal judicial system).
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 70, at 555.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
94. See id. (setting forth preeminence of federal law).
95. For a further discussion of state court obligations to exercise jurisdiction
conferred under federal law, see supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
96. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-1, at
297 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing scope of and limitations on congressional power).
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Two additional questions are left open by the Testa doctrine. The first
is the extent to which Congress may impose costs and hardships on the
state courts. In deciding both Testa and its progeny, the Supreme Court
has always been clear that state courts of general jurisdiction cannot otherwise discriminate against federal claims; however, the Supreme Court has
never decided to what extent state courts must discriminate in favor of
federal claims, and not only hear these claims, but also apply procedures
that would otherwise burden state courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
made clear that state courts need not entertain federal claims when they
have an "otherwise valid excuse" for so doing. 97 Procedural requirements
that would place heavy burdens on state courts, as the tobacco settlement's
proposal surely would have done, may well fall outside of Testa's
mandate. 98
Second, there is nothing in the Testa doctrine to suggest that congressional control over state courts may extend to procedures applicable in
state law actions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has only considered
whether state courts are required to be open to the concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims. 99 But what is to be made of the case, as suggested
by the proposed tobacco settlement or the proposed Securities Reform
Act, when Congress seeks not to create a federal action, but merely to
tinker with the procedures applicable in an otherwise existing state action?
Does Testa apply here or would such congressional action violate the
states' own sovereignty? In other words, does congressional regulation of
state law actions intrude upon the domain of states recognized by the
Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause? 100 Each of these questions, critical to the constitutionality of the proposed settlement, is discussed below.
C.

The Scope of CongressionalAuthority

For any congressional regulation of state court procedures to be constitutional, Congress must have the requisite constitutional authority. 10 1
In the case of the proposed tobacco settlement, Congress would likely
have been operating pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate com97. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929) (stating that act of Congress does not force duty to entertain suits upon state court
having otherwise valid excuse); see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95

COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1076 (1995) (discussing valid excuse doctrine).
98. For a further discussion of the impact of the tobacco proposal on state
courts, see infra notes 317-24 and accompanying test.
99. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States:
A New Role for the Guarantee Clause,65 U. COLO. L. REv. 815, 822-27 (1994) [herein-

after Merritt, Guarantee Clause] (discussing issues of justiciability).
100. See id. at 823-24 (discussing nonjusticiability in association with Guarantee Clause).
101. See TRIBE, supra note 96, § 5-2, at 298 (stating that act of Congress is
invalid unless it is affirmatively authorized under Constitution).
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merce.10 2 There is little doubt that the manufacture and sale of tobacco is
an interstate activity that substantially affects the national economy.1 03
Similar arguments can also be made to justify congressional authority over
securities, vaccines or other products for which Congress has considered
10 4
regulating state court procedures.
Because Congress can regulate tobacco, securities markets or vaccines, it can undoubtedly legislate substantive standards for such industries and create private causes of action to remedy violations of those
substantive standards. Under Article III, Congress could go even further
and give the federal courts jurisdiction over such claims. 10 5 In addition,
Congress could use its regulatory powers to preempt state court actions
over such industries, vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Similarly, under the Testa doctrine, Congress could either assume that
the state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising
under such a hypothetical "federal tobacco control law," or Congress
could simply rely upon state courts of general jurisdiction to enforce the
federal tobacco control law to the extent that the preexisting jurisdiction
of the state courts permitted them to hear such cases. 106 In this sense,
through the normal operations of preemption and Testa, Congress could
require the state courts to hear federal tobacco claims.
Less clear is to what extent Congress could regulate the procedures
that would be followed by a state court when it adjudicated our hypothetical federal tobacco claim. The question of whether state or federal procedures must be applied when state courts adjudicate federal claims is, in
essence, the mirror-image of the undeniably moot debate as to the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") to state law
claims adjudicated in federal court. 10 7 In that context, the answer arrived
102. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to regulate commerce among several states).
103. See RicHAm KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CICARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILLIP MORRIS

748 (1997) (stating that in mid 1990s, 45 million consumers spent approximately
55 billion dollars per year on tobacco products).
104. See Gray, supra note 69, at 607 ("There is no question that the federal
government has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state tort
claims.").
105. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that Congress has power to determine extent of court jurisdiction).
106. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 70, at 553-57 (noting that unless
Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts, normal assumption would

be that state courts retained concurrent jurisdiction). But see Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929) (suggesting that it is not clear that
Congress could require state courts that do not otherwise have jurisdiction over

tort claims to hear such claims). For a further discussion of state courts' obligations to exercise jurisdiction conferred under federal law, see supra notes 70-89

and accompanying text.
107. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965) (discussing whether
state or federal procedures must be applied when state courts adjudicate federal
claims); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945) (same); see also
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at by the Supreme Court, in Hanna v. Plummer,10 8 is that congressional
authority over federal courts extends so far as to permit application of the
Rules in federal courts even when the underlying claim arises under state
09
law.1
Our "reverse-Erie" question, however, has not been answered as decisively. 1 10 The case that most clearly addressed the issue was Dice v. Akron,
1 12
Canton & Youngstown Railroad,"' another case arising under FELA.
Dice was brought in an Ohio court of common pleas. 1" 3 The issue was
whether federal or Ohio law determined if ajudge or a jury should decide
if a release was fraudulently obtained." 14 Under Ohio law, a judge was
permitted to resolve all factual questions of fraud "other than fraud in the
factum." t1 5 Federal courts would have left the issue of fraud fully to the
jury.
In an opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court held that federal
law applied.1 16 The Court noted that it had previously found that the Seventh Amendment's requirement for ajury trial did not apply to state court
proceedings under FELA."1 7 Because Ohio had indeed provided for a
jury trial, the Court found that the determination of fraud was "too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit it to be classified
as a mere 'local rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio has
118
here used."
378-81 (4th ed. 1994) (analyzing whether state or federal procedures must be applied when state courts adjudicate federal claims); John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv.L. REv.
693, 693 (1974) (debating whether state or federal procedures must be applied
when state courts adjudicate federal claims).
108. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
109. See id. at 473 (recognizing power of Congress to prescribe rules for federal courts even though those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state
rules).
110. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. Rxv.
1, 34 (1963) (discussing reverse-Erie doctrine); see also Margaret G. Stewart, Federalism and Supremacy: Control of StateJudicialDecision Making, 68 CHi.-KETr L. REv. 431
(1992) (commenting on Erie doctrine as it applies to cases in state courts arising
under federal law).
111. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
112. See id. at 360.
113. See id.
114. See id. (regarding injured railroad employee's claim that he was fraudulently induced to settle claim).
115. See id. at 362-63 (splitting fraud into fragments to be determined by
judge and jury).
116. See id. at 363. The Court held that "[i]t follows that the right to trial by
jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit it to be
classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio
has here used." Id. (citing Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).
117. See id. (noting previous holding that state may, consistent with federal
Constitution, provide for trial of cases under FELA) (citing Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1916)).
118. Id. (citing Brown, 338 U.S. at 298-99).
CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
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The somewhat mysterious rationale for Dice, and its fellow FELA cases,
has long puzzled commentators. 1 19 Debate exists over whether the Court
meant to imply that federal law governs the procedures applicable for federal actions in state courts-in other words, that the answer to the reverseErie question is that federal procedures follow federal claims to state
courts-or whether the Court simply meant that the issue of whether a
federal question went to a jury was too entwined into the nature of the
federal right to be considered a mere question of procedure.
Recently, Professor Margaret G. Stewart argued that despite Dice, Professor Henry Hart was generally correct when he stated that " [t] he general
rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state
judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds
them."1 20 According to Professor Stewart, the answer to the reverse-Erie
question is that Congress may impose procedures on states only when the
imposition is necessary to prevent the frustration of a congressional remedial purpose. 12 1 Thus, Congress' power under Article I does not extend
to the regulation of state courts even when they are adjudicating federal
issues. When Congress relies upon state courts for the enforcement of
federal law, however, it can require that state courts follow such procedures that are "necessary and proper" to prevent the undermining of the
federal goal. 122 Hence, the problem in Dice was that the particular state
rule relied upon by Ohio, which removed the question of fraud from the
23
jury, threatened to undermine the very purpose of FELA.1
This interpretation of Dice is made plausible by recent Section 1983
cases. 124 In Felder v. Casey,125 the question was whether Wisconsin's notice119. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 296 (discussing whether federal or state law controlled in case arising under federal law in state court); Bailey v. Central Vermont

Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (deciding whether federal or state law controlled);
Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 217 (considering whether federal or state law controlled in
case arising under federal law in state court).
120. Stewart, supra note 110, at 433 (citing Henry Hart, The Relations Between
State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954)).
121. See id. at 437 (stating that relevant case law reveals concern that unnecessary state rules may frustrate congressional remedial purpose); see alsoJoan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IowA L. Riv. 1030, 1115-16 (1993) (arguing that state
rules frustrate congressional remedial purpose); Weinberg, supra note 90, at 75657 (discussing power of Congress over state courts).
122. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 361 (holding that federal rights affording relief to
injured railroad employees under federally declared standard could be defeated if
states were permitted to have final say as to what defenses could and could not be
properly interposed to suits under FELA).
123. See id. ("Application of so harsh a rule to defeat a railroad employee's
claim is wholly incongruous with the general policy of the Act to give railroad
employees a right to recover just compensation for injuries negligently inflicted by
their employers.").
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365
(1990) (evaluating Section 1983 action in light of sovereign immunity); Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988) (considering applicability of notice-of-claim statute
in Section 1983 claim).
125. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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of-claim statute could apply in a Section 1983 case brought in state court
against the City of Milwaukee and some of its police officers. 126 Writing
for the Court, Justice Brennan held that the notice-of-claim statute had to
give way to the supremacy of federal law. 127 In reaching that conclusion,
Brennan did not deny that "[s] tates may establish the rules of procedure
governing litigation in their own courts." 128 What states cannot do, according to Brennan, is use their local procedures to defeat a federal right,
and he found that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute would do just
that. 129 According to the Court, the provision was not a "neutral and uniformly applicable rule of procedure; rather it [wals a substantive burden
imposed only upon those who seek redress for injuries resulting from the
use or misuse of governmental authority.' 30 Accordingly, Brennan found
that the provision actually discriminated against the exercise of federal
rights and thus clearly violated the supreme federal law as set forth in
Section 1983.131
Professor Stewart's hypothesis is further supported by Howlett v.
Rose. 13 2 In Howlett, the Court was faced with whether Florida's law of sovereign immunity could apply in a Section 1983 action brought in Florida
court.

33

Relying upon the Supremacy Clause, a unanimous Supreme

Court reaffirmed the Testa doctrine and held that state courts "presumptively have the obligation to apply federal law to a dispute before them and
may not deny a federal right in the absence of a valid defense."13 4 While
finding that the Florida sovereign immunity defense was incompatible
with Section 1983 and federal law, the Court noted that "[t]he requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the
law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that
the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal
claim is presented." 135 The Court found that the general rule, "bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial proce126. See id. at 134 (discussing whether state statute requiring 120-day notification of party prior to bringing suit when party is state, local government entity or
officer is applicable when action is based on Section 1983).
127. See id. at 136-40 (holding that because Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute
conflicted in both its purpose and effects with Section 1983's remedial objectives,
it was preempted pursuant to Supremacy Clause when Section 1983 action is
brought in state court).
128. Id. at 138.
129. See id. (citing Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).
130. Id. at 141.
131. See id. at 145 (finding that state notice-of-claim statute discriminates
against type of claim created by Congress).
132. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
133. See id. at 359. The plaintiff filed a complaint naming the county school
board and three school officials as defendants. See id. He alleged that an assistant
principal illegally searched his car while it was parked on school premises and that
his subsequent suspension was improper. See id.
134. Id. at 370.
135. Id. at 372.
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dure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them."1 36 Thus,
the Court reinforced the notion that even when state courts adjudicate
federal claims that are valid under Article I, the normal assumption is that
they are not critical to the validity of the
state procedures, at least when
13 7
federal claim, will apply.
Of course, all of these cases deal with the ability of Congress to regulate state court procedures employed in the enforcement of federal regulatory schemes. Left undecided was Congress' ability to regulate state
court procedures applicable to questions of state law arising in state court
actions, as the proposed tobacco settlement would have done. 138 The first
question must be whether the fact that Congress, under Article I, can create both federal jurisdiction and a federal cause of action is sufficient to
provide Congress with the possibly lesser authority to regulate the procedures employed when a state enforces its own laws.
There can be no definitive answer to the question. Neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have fully faced it, nor did the Framers ever opine about the subject.' 39 Indeed, until recently, the question
had the airy "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin" quality to
it that makes federal jurisdiction such an infamous subject among law
students.
Still, both the proposed tobacco settlement and the pending Securities Reform Act would have tested the question. 140 In our case, the issue is
whether the fact that Article I permits Congress to create a hypothetical
tobacco settlement or Securities Reform Act means that Congress can regulate state procedures in state courts for state causes of action.
Two axioms should guide the analysis. The first is that while Article I
itself gives Congress the authority to regulate commerce, Article I does not
136. Id. (quoting Hart, supra note 120, at 508).
137. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Article III does not permit Congress to control proceedings
in state courts).
138. For a further discussion of Congress' ability to regulate state court procedures, see supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
139. See Lebow, supra note 65, at 677-90 (tracing notion of inherent independence of state judicial systems within constitutional structure and concluding that
"the Constitution simply does not confer upon Congress the ability to require the
states to govern according to Congress' instructions" as considered in context of
federal product liability reform); Weinberg, supra note 90, at 732-33 (discussing
Congress' power to confer jurisdiction over nonfederal cases upon state courts); see
also Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalism,44 DEPAUL
L. REv. 755, 765-67 (1995) (considering constitutional implications of arguments
in support of federalizing mass tort law).
140. See Tobacco Proposal supra note 4, at 39 (prohibiting joinder devices and
specifying removal procedures for suits by person claiming injury or damage
caused by conduct prior to effective date of proposed act); see also Securities Reform Act, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998) (limiting remedies available under
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 (1994)), including permissible state court jurisdiction over class actions based
on statutory law or common law of states).
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give Congress the authority to regulate state procedures qua state procedures. Indeed, there is nothing in Article I that gives Congress the authority to oversee generally the operation of state courts, nor does Article III
provide any authority for congressional control over state court procedures. 14 1 Of course, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may at
times do precisely that when such regulation is necessary to ensure either
due process of law or equal protection of the laws, but neither Article I nor
Article III speaks to state court procedures in and of themselves. Thus,
unless the Fourteenth Amendment comes into play, congressional authority must be tied to the commerce power, for as Justice Frankfurter noted
in his concurring opinion in Dice, federal regulation of state procedures
must be justified by reference to some grant of congressional or at least
14 2
federal authority in the Constitution.
The second axiom is that there is no clear magical division between
federal cases and state cases. Indeed, the very categorization used thus far
is clearly simplistic, and the distinction is useful only for purposes of facilitating discussion. As far back as Osborn v. Bank of the United States,14 3 the

Supreme Court realized that, for constitutional purposes, a case may simultaneously arise under the laws of the United States and fall within the
jurisdiction of Article III even if Congress has not created the cause of

141. See COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 53, at 183 ("Congress has no constitutional obligation to provide for federal courtjurisdiction over actions within concurrent federal and state court jurisdictional reach, such as diversity cases."). In
proposing that interstate mass tort cases be transferred to and consolidated in a
state court, the ALI suggested that Article III provides Congress with the authority
to vest jurisdiction in and regulate state courts. See id. The ALI's argument was
that because Article III does not compel the creation of federal courts, Congress
can rely on state courts and effectively federalize them. See id. The assertion that
Article III grants Congress the power to federalize state courts rests upon a quite
broad reading of that Article, one that neither the text nor the history of Article III
can support. See id. Evidently, even the ALI proposal's reporters did not feel entirely comfortable with their argument because they also relied upon state consent
to justify the constitutionality of their proposal. See id. Additionally, commentators
have questioned the constitutionality of this proposal. See Steinman, supra note
121, at 1032 (considering whether ALI's proposal violates Article III, curtails federal district court jurisdiction or unlawfully delegates Tenth Amendment power to
state and federal judiciaries, and analyzing "whether the Proposal violates Fifth
Amendment equal protection principles by treating complex cases differently than
cases not affected by the Proposal"). For a more developed analysis of whether
Congress can federalize state courts under Article III when state courts exercise
federal Article III jurisdiction, see Prakash, supra note 70, at 2010-11. Prakash concluded that nothing in Article III indicated whether state courts may be commandeered into enforcing federal law as Article III courts. See id.
142. See generally Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R., 342 U.S. 359, 365
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that state courts are under no duty to
adhere to different procedures when adjudicating federal actions than when adjudicating local actions). For a further discussion of Fourteenth Amendment considerations, see infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
143. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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action. 144 More pointedly, the scope of federal preeminence under the
Supremacy Clause has never been thought to be limited to federal causes
of action. We all know that federal defenses can preempt state laws and
can be applied to state actions in state court; indeed, this principle is
demonstrated each time a state cause of action is found to be preempted
145
by a federal statute or in violation of the federal Constitution.
In the case of the tobacco settlement, therefore, it is somewhat simplistic to assume that individual liability claims in state court could not
raise federal claims. Although the proposed settlement did not attempt to
create a federal cause of action or alter the substance of state tort law, the
settlement certainly did envision a plethora of federal defenses. For example, a defense could have arisen under the settlement's provisions pertaining to limitations on damages, as well as under the settlement's attempted
preemption of local tobacco control laws. 146 Moreover, questions of federal constitutional law could arise in any state tobacco control case, as they
can in any other state court matter, for under the Supremacy Clause, any
issue or ruling of state law may always be scrutinized for its fidelity to the
47
Constitution. 1
As a result of the implications of the Supremacy Clause and the everpresent possibility that federal issues may arise in state cases, the analysis of
144. See id. at 828 (finding clause in act of incorporation enabling Bank of
United States to sue in federal courts constitutional, even though Congress did not
grant jurisdiction in this specific action).
145. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (holding
that § 514(a) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994), supersedes state law claim for alleged improper
processing of claim for benefits under ERISA-regulated benefit plan).
146. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1994) (specifying federal courts' jurisdiction, venue
and removal procedure in actions involving foreign states and stating that foreign
states shall be immune from jurisdiction of state courts in certain circumstances);
Vaccine Injury Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 300a-1 (1994) (prohibiting any court
from finding that hospital which receives funds while acting under color of state
law is valid exercise of constitutional power); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997 (SLUSA), S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending Securities Act
of 1934 to limit conduct of securities class actions under state law); Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996) (governing any product
liability action brought in any state or federal court on any theory for harm caused
by product); see also Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 39-41 (prescribing allowable
punitive damages and imposing caps on judgments and settlements). The proposal also limits state enforcement proceedings to such requirements imposed by
proposed legislation where legislation does not specifically preempt additional
state law obligations. See id. at 26; see also Daynard & Parmet, Working Paper #8,
supra note 33, at 2-3 ("Given the fact that tobacco is a good bought and sold in
interstate commerce, the general ability of Congress to preempt state law claims
should not be constitutionally troubling, even after the Supreme Court's more restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 513 U.S. 549
(1995).").
147. See generallyJOHN GisHrAm, THE RUNAWAY JuRy (1997) (telling fictional
story in which members of jury in tobacco case were taking bribes, which raised
question of due process).
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whether Congress' Article I power allows it to regulate procedures in state
courts must be refined. The Dice doctrine cannot be mechanically tied to
federal causes of action; rather, the doctrine more correctly extends to
procedures and procedural rules that pertain to the adjudication of Article I questions. Thus, Congress can create a federal defense and by extension, when the necessity arises due to federal interest, Congress should
have the authority to regulate the manner in which state courts hear and
1 48
decide that defense.
Under the proposed tobacco settlement, however, as well as the proposed Securities Reform Act, federal intervention in state court procedure
would have exceeded that which could be considered necessary to support
the adjudication of the settlement's federal substantive elements. 149
Though a provision requiring all privilege claims to be adjudicated by a
federal panel may have supported a federal interest in protecting documents that affect interstate commerce, the proposal's ban on class actions
andjoinder of claims was not necessary for or related to any of the particular defenses provided by the settlement. 150 Thus, the procedural prohibitions would not have affected the standards of care demanded of tobacco
companies, the issues relevant at trial or even the extent of damages
due. 15 1 Of course, in practical terms the procedural regulations may be
seen as embodying a congressional decision to discourage plaintiffs' actions by making them prohibitively expensive. 15 2 But if such deterrence is
the federal interest intended to be advanced by federalizing state procedures, the interest is not otherwise articulated by the substantive provisions of the proposal. Hence, the regulation of procedure was divorced
from any federal interests explicitly governed by the proposal. By making
148. See Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996)
(establishing legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation and for
other purposes). Without discussing this nuance, one commentator nevertheless
argued that the Product Liability Reform Act would be unconstitutional. See
Lebow, supra note 65, at 679, 690 (stating that "the constitutional failings of the
current legislation derive from a scheme that imposes upon sovereign state judicial
systems 'legislative regulation' of court procedures and processes" and suggesting
alternatives).
149. See SLUSA, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1998) (limiting conduct of securities class actions under state law).
150. See Tobacco Proposa4 supra note 4, at 66 (requiring three-judge panel to
decide all privilege or trade secrecy challenges asserted by federal government).
The proposal provides that "disputes shall be judged in accordance with the ALI/
ABA model rules and/or principles of federal law with respect to privilege." Id. at
10. For a further discussion of issues related to this panel, see Parmet, Working
Paper #3, supra note 21, at 9-11.
151. See CHRISTOPHER B.

MUELLER

&

LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE

249 (1995) (stating that "relevance is determined by the issues raised by the parties," and by prohibiting class actions, only evidence pertaining to particular individual claims would be relevant and admissible).

152. For a further discussion of the expense of tobacco-related litigation, see
infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
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litigation less efficient, the proposal could be read to promote a federal
interest in only a stealth or hidden manner.
Due to its separation from any articulated federal issue, the settlement's prohibition ofjoinder and class actions in state courts must bejustified in one of two ways. The first would be to seek a source of
congressional power other than the Commerce Clause, such as the Fourteenth Amendment. The second relies on asserting that Article I permits
Congress to adopt a far more restrictive limitation than that included in
the proposal; that is, because Congress under Article I has the power to
create a wholly federal cause of action regarding tobacco liability, it can
1 53
adopt the more limited measure of restrictingjoinder and class actions.
In other words, because Congress has the authority to legislate limits on
tobacco actions in particular, Congress must have the power to enact more
modest procedural intrusions aimed at reducing efficiency and, consequently, discouraging litigation.
To see why this is not necessarily the case, it may be helpful to revisit
the analogous, but ultimately reverse, question of whether the Constitution grants Congress the power to create "protective jurisdiction." In that
case, the issue is whether the fact that Congress can preempt state law and
create a federal cause of action under Article I also permits Congress to
vest Article III courts with state law claims dealing with the same subject
matter. 154
The arguments in support of protective jurisdiction are very similar to
those in favor of congressional regulation of state court procedures in tobacco litigation. 1 5 5 Primarily, proponents point out that if Congress has
the far greater power of simply overwhelming state law and creating a fed153. See Daynard & Parmet, Working Paper#8, supra note 33, at 1 (stating that
"the McCain Committee bill more clearly treats all tort claims against tobacco
manufactures as federal actions" and concluding "the bill would result in an enormous preemption of state law"). The Commerce Committee bill, in fact, would
have created a federal cause of action.
154. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The ProtectiveJurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542, 618 (1983) (concluding that "arising under" clause of
Article III should be read to include protective jurisdiction claims); Paul J.
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 184-88
(1953) (considering effects of assigning all constitutional cases to lower federal
courts); Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234-35 (1948) (questioning whether federal courts
should regulate state law).
155. See Steinman, supra note 121, at 1113 (disagreeing with arguments supporting congressional regulation of state court procedure). Steinman argues convincingly that grave constitutional problems would face this proposal, which is less
constitutionally suspect than either the proposed tobacco settlement or the proposed securities laws reform. See id. The ALI proposal at least would have relied
upon state consent and would have federalized state procedures only for cases that
began in federal court and, hence, were within the bounds of Article III. See id.
Both the tobacco and securities proposals, in contrast, would have applied federal
procedural requirements in cases for which there was no Article III jurisdiction
and in instances where there is no consent of the state.
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eral cause of action, why should it not have the lesser power of simply
creating federal jurisdiction? After all, proponents suggest, exercise of
this lesser power is in many ways more respectful of federalism than would
be total federal control of an issue. 1 56 By using protective jurisdiction,
Congress allows states to continue to set the substantive legal standards in
an area. Congress merely provides a "protective haven" for the federal
interest in terms of federal jurisdiction, allowing cases concerning a particular field to be regulated in federal courts, where federal procedural rules
and independent Article III judges reign.
The problem is, however, that the Supreme Court has never endorsed
the concept of protective jurisdiction. Indeed, various justices have given
us much reason to believe that there is substantial judicial hostility to the

57
idea. In his famous dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,1 Jus-

tice Frankfurter exclaimed, "Surely the truly technical restrictions of Article III are not met or respected by a beguiling phrase that the greater
power here must necessarily include the lesser .... It is obvious that very

different considerations apply to cases involving questions of federal law
and those turning solely on state law."' 58 He went on to note that the
theory of protective jurisdiction disregarded both the text and history of
the Constitution and was troubling because it had "as its sole justification a
belief in the inadequacy of state tribunals in determining state law.' 59
The Supreme Court has declined other opportunities to approve the
concept of protective jurisdiction. In Verlinden B. V. v. CentralBank of Nige-

ria,1 60 a case arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
Court avoided an endorsement of protective jurisdiction by ruling that
more traditional Article IIIjurisdiction existed because the statute at issue
set forth "detailed federal law standards.' 6 1 Although the cause of action
remained one created by state law, Article III jurisdiction was not tested
because the cause remained one that, in the meaning of Osborn, actually
arose under federal law. 162 In addition, in Mesa v. California,163 the Court
upheld the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1), the federal removal statute, only because the federal employee-defendant was raising a federal defense.' 6 4 Removal in cases in which no federal defense would be raised,
156. See generally Steinman, supra note 121, at 1040-48 (arguing that intersystem consolidation is "good" and provides more control to litigants).
157. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
158. Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
160. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
161. See id. at 494 (declining to endorse concept of protective jurisdiction).
162. For a further discussion of Osborn, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
163. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
164. See id. at 135 (concluding that there is no reason to depart from pre-

empting federal defense requirement).
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the Court suggested, would "unnecessarily present grave constitutional
problems."1 65 The Court added:
We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of
'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing so here because we
do not recognize any federal interests that are not protected by
limiting removal to situations in which a federal defense is
66
alleged.'
More recently, the possibility of protective jurisdiction was considered
in the unusual case of Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,' 67 which concerned

the reviewability of decisions made by the U.S. Attorney to designate the
United States as a defendant and to remove cases to federal court under
the Westfall Act. 168 Although diversity of citizenship secured jurisdiction
in the particular case before the Court, several of the Justices were clearly
troubled by the question of whether jurisdiction to review the U.S. Attorney's decision and, in the appropriate case, reinstate the original defendant would exist if the parties were not diverse. 169 Writing for the majority,
Justice Ginsberg suggested that a district court could retain jurisdiction
under such circumstances because the very issue of whether the U.S. Attorney had made the correct decision would be a nonfrivolous federal question that satisfied Article 111.170 Thus, Justice Ginsberg would have
17 1
grounded jurisdiction under Osborn.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, was more troubled by the Article III issue, but she did not feel the need to resolve it because of the
presence of diversity in the instant case. 172 Dissenting for himself and
four other Justices, Justice Souter found the U.S. Attorney's actions unreviewable precisely because a contrary result could lead to Article III
problems. 173 Hence, five Justices expressed significant qualms over ex165. See id. at 137 ("We are not inclined to abandon a long-standing reading
of the officer removal statute that clearly preserves its constitutionality and adopt
one which raises serious constitutional doubt.").
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. 515 U.S. 417 (1995), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 335 (1997).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (1994) (stating that FTCA alone provides remedy for torts committed by federal officers acting in course of official duty, substituting United States as defendant).
169. See Gutierrez, 515 U.S. at 440 (questioning appropriateness of retaining
federal jurisdiction absent diversity of parties).
170. See id. at 435 ("[W]e do not think the Article III problem amicus describes is a grave one .... [T] here was a nonfrivolous federal question, certified
by the local United States Attorney, when the case was removed to federal court.").
171. For a further discussion of Osborn, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
172. See Gutierrez, 515 U.S. at 437 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("In my view, we
should not resolve [the Article III] question until it is necessary for us to do so.").
173. See id. at 443 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding U.S. Attorney's actions unreviewable within purview of Article III).
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pansive notions of Article III that would place cases in which there was no
diversityjurisdiction in federal court once there was no substantive federal
issue left in the case. 174 Moreover, none of the Justices saw protective jurisdiction as a solution.
Further, the theory of protective jurisdiction antedates more recent
cases that have shown a heightened judicial sensitivity to federal-state
boundaries and the norms of federalism. Indeed, the debate over protective jurisdiction has not yet reflected the significance of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez. 175 Lopez dealt with the Gun-Free
School Zones Act 1 76 and showed a new or renewed determination on the
part of the Supreme Court to review congressional claims of authority
under the Commerce Clause.1 77 The Lopez Court recognized that
although the commerce power is broad, it is not unlimited, and the Court
will not simply defer to any congressional assertion to be acting pursuant
to that authority.' 78 Claims that the commerce power inherently extends
the scope of federal court jurisdiction must be reconsidered in light of
Lopez and its insistence on a more limited scope of the Commerce Clause.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v. United States,179 which

found that Congress lacked the power under Article I to compel the State
of New York to "take tile" to low-level radioactive waste, also supports this
conclusion.' 80 While the import of that case will be considered more
thoroughly below, the relevant point here is the Court's rejection of the
theory that because Congress could have thoroughly preempted the field,
it surely had the lesser power to work through the states and require them
174. See id. (stating that Court's views invite difficult and wholly unnecessary
constitutional adjudication about limits of Article III jurisdiction, and are powerful

reasons to recognize unreviewability of certification).
175. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25)-(26), 9 22(q), 924(a) (4) (1994).
177. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1454 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (examining limits imposed by recent ruling in Lopez, concluding that
federal statute criminalizing illegal gambling is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 690 (1997).
178. See id. at 1448-49 (citing cases that have resisted urges to extend Lopez,
and noting scarcity of cases relying on Lopez to reverse conviction). Lower courts
have in some instances, however, found federal statutes to exceed the scope of
congressional commerce authority. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1502, 1503-04 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (finding pertinent application of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995), in violation of Commerce Clause as interpreted in
Lopez), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp.
1360, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding Lopez to be directly relevant and striking down
as unconstitutional Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106
Stat. 3403 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 228 and 42 U.S.C. § 3796cc3796cc-6 (1994))).
179. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
180. See id. at 188 ("Whatever the outer limits of [states'] sovereignty may be,

one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.").
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to do Congress' bidding.18 1 According to Justice O'Connor, the greater
authority does not necessarily legitimize the lesser.18 2 Moreover, novel
schemes that may appear at first glance to be more respectful of the states
because they leave them with some role to play may still unconstitutionally
exceed Congress' authority under Article 1.183 Although these observations have not yet been made in a case implicating either the theory of
protective jurisdiction itself or the ability of Congress to regulate state
court procedures in state law actions, they at least suggest that the mere
fact that Congress can create a federal tobacco control law, and can either
grant the federal courts jurisdiction over claims under such a law or regulate the procedures in state courts when they administer such a law, does
not mean that Congress can regulate state court procedures for state law
claims. The greater, at least in constitutional law, does not always imply
the lesser.
D.

Other Sources of CongressionalAuthority

The most obvious constitutional source for congressional authority
over state court procedures in tobacco liability trials, or other state tort
trials, is Article I's Commerce Clause. But as suggested above, it is not at
all clear that Article I provides such authority, at least when the state procedures at issue are not incidental to federal substantive commands. If the
commerce power does not authorize the federalization of state court procedures, some other constitutional foundation would be necessary to ensure the proposal's constitutionality. Only two candidates readily appear:
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the
authority to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of" the
Amendment.18 4 There is little doubt that those provisions pertain to the
181. For a further discussion of the significance of New York, see infra notes
246-64 and accompanying text.
182. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-72 (rejecting view that permissible congressional preemption of states' authority legitimizes congressional compulsion for
states as well).
183. See id. at 162 ("While Congress has substantial powers to govern the nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution
has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions").
184. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Interestingly, the proposed codifications
of the settlement did not purport to rest congressional authority upon any constitutional provision other than the Commerce Clause. For instance, the version of
tobacco legislation reported to the Senate, Senate Bill 1415, explicitly stated that
tobacco is sold, distributed and marketed in interstate commerce. See National
Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act., S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 2(10)
(1998) ("[T]he sale, distribution, marketing, advertising and use of tobacco products are activities in and substantially affecting interstate commerce. Such products are sold, marketed, advertised, and distributed in interstate commerce on a
nationwide basis, and have a substantial effect on the Nation's economy."). The
bill also found that civil actions pertaining to tobacco are "complex, time-consuming, expensive and burdensome for both the litigants and Federal and State
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conduct of state court trials. For example, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of
their race. 185 Furthermore, the Amendment's Due Process Clause sets
limits on a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. 186 The fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to state court procedures suggests that
under Section 5, Congress may enact some laws that pertain to state court
procedures. It does not mean, however, that any particular federal regulation of state court procedures is justified.
The degree to which Congress may act under the authority of Section
5 has long been a subject of intense debate. 187 Recently, the issue was
reconsidered by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,188 a case
arising under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).189 RFRA
was enacted by Congress ostensibly to enforce rights protected under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The only problem was that
the Supreme Court, in the earlier case of Employment Division, Departmentof
Human Resources v. Smith, 190 did not agree with Congress' assessment as to
what constituted protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
courts." Id. § 2(14). The source of Congress' power to relieve such a burden,
however, was not stated.
185. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) ("We hold that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) ("Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.").
186. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 736 (1877) (holding that enforcement
ofjudgments may be resisted if in violation of due process of law afforded by Fourteenth Amendment), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
For a further discussion of this issue, see Weinberg, supra note 90, at 753-55. Another obvious example is the Fourteenth Amendment's limitation on the use of
illegally seized evidence in state criminal trials. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
654 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.").
187. See Akil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1256 (1992) (citing congressional regard for Bill of Rights in late nineteenth
century as "paradigmatic privileges under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Christopher L. Eisengruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution,69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 47, 80-82 (1995) (distinguishing Section 5's explicit grant of authority
to Congress to enforce Constitution from Section 5's lack of judicial authority
granted to enforce Constitution); Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 Mo. L. Rxv. 499, 549-51
(1994) ("Contemporary state action doctrine deals as uneasily with the role of
Congress under Section 5 as it does with the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to private initiatives.").
188. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) restored the compelling interest test, guaranteeing its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened, and it provided a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. See id. § 2000bb-1.
190. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The issue in Boerne, therefore, was the degree to which Congress
could use Section 5 to protect rights that the Court itself did not believe
were guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 1 In an
opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court concluded that Congress did not
have the authority to enact RFRA, because "Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing
19 2
would no longer be . . .'provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."
The analysis in Boerne suggests that Congress lacks unlimited authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, Congress can
only use Section 5 to remedy violations of rights otherwise established
under Section 1. Clearly, Congress could meet that test with respect to
some hypothetical regulations of state court procedures.19 3 For example,
a federal statute prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges should satisfy Boerne's edict. It seems doubtful, however, that the proposed federalization of state court procedures in state tobacco cases could be justified as
a remedy for a constitutional violation. Although it is likely that a federal
law that required state court class actions to satisfy due process notice requirements would be within Section 5, it is difficult to see how due process
could be said to prohibit the use of any class actions orjoinder in a state
tobacco or securities case. Thus, because there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to a prohibition ofjoined claims, class actions or consolidated
actions, it would be difficult to justify the proposal's recommendations as
authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
One last potential source for congressional authority may exist within
Article I's Spending Clause.1 94 In furtherance of its authority to "provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare," Congress may attach con191. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (enforcing section of federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e) (1994), that is
contrary to New York state law establishing English literacy requirement and holding that Section 5 allows its enforcement); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883)
("Under the Fourteenth Amendment, [Congress] has power to counteract and
render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any
of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them
of life, liberty or property without due process of law .
").
192. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
193. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-13 (1985) (hold-

ing that Kansas procedure of sending fully descriptive notices to each class member with explanation of right to "opt-out" satisfies due process because interests of

absent class members are sufficiently protected by state when plaintiffs are provided with request for exclusion); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class
Action: A Policy Primeron Refomt, 62

IND.

L.J. 625, 661 (1987) (arguing that recent

cases have given class action plaintiffs absolute right to opt-out in all but "true
limited fund" cases); Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core
and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY LJ. 85, 143

(1997) (arguing that opt-out rights are powerful bargaining tools that can destroy
very existence of class actions).
194. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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ditions to states' behavior in exchange for their receipt of federal
money.' 9 5 Although quite broad, this power is "not unlimited." 9 6 Most
particularly, conditions imposed upon states in return for federal money
must be related to the federal interest in the particular national projects
or programs financed by the federal purse. 197 This suggests that if Congress wishes to use its spending power to regulate state procedures, it
would be wise to do so through grants and appropriations directly aimed
at supporting state courts. The federal grants called for in the tobacco
settlement, which would have provided financial support for public health
initiatives designed to curb tobacco use and provided grants to state health
programs to pay for the care of tobacco-related illnesses, would hardly
seem sufficiently related to prohibitions on class actions, consolidations
andjoinders in state courts so as to authorize their prohibition under the
Spending Clause.' 98 This would especially appear to be so given the significant intrusion into state sovereignty that such a prohibition would
cause.19 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court requires Congress to speak with
great clarity about Spending Clause conditions before the Court will require states to comply with those conditions. 20 0 Unless the regulation of
state court procedures was explicitly and closely tied to the receipt of federal money, so that states would be free to choose to forgo the money in
exchange for ignoring the prohibitions, it is unlikely that the Supreme
195. Id. § 8, cl. 1; see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-76 (1992)
(upholding obligations placed upon states by Congress to provide for disposal of
radioactive waste within their borders by setting forth monetary and access incentives as consistent with constitutional division of power between federal and state
governments); Steward Machine Co. v. Advise, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1938) (validating
Title IX of Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 620-48 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which provides for proceeds of tax to go to treasury and allows taxpayers 90% credit if contributions were made under state unemployment certified by Federal Social Security Board as satisfying certain
conditions). A full discussion of congressional authority under the Spending
Clause is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally AlbertJ. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1131-35 (1987)
(discussing constitutional questions of Congress' power and capability to impose
conditions on federal fund recipients as means of regulating behavior and activities otherwise beyond its control).
196. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (outlining general
limitations on Congress' spending power and concluding that it must be exercised
to serve general public purposes, done unambiguously so states are aware of conditions on receipt of federal funds, must be related to "federal interest in particular
national projects or programs" and noting that other constitutional provisions may
separately prevent conditional grant of federal funds) (citing Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981)).
197. See id. at 207-09 (discussing federal spending authority).
198. For a further discussion of the goals of the proposed tobacco settlement,
see Tobacco Proposal supra note 4, at 36.
199. For a further discussion of the intrusion into state sovereignty, see infra
notes 201-64 and accompanying text.
200. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 ("[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.").
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Court would find that the Spending Clause authorized the proposed federal regulation of state court procedures.
E.

Issues of State Autonomy: The Tenth Amendment

Thus far the discussion has focused on the extent of congressional
authority and whether congressional power under either Article I or the
Fourteenth Amendment extends so far as to authorize congressional regulation of state court procedures. 20 1 Missing from the analysis has been a
consideration of what role, if any, federalism and solicitude for state interests should play in the consideration of congressional authority. When we

consider the nature of congressional authority under Article I, according
to Justice O'Connor, we must also consider whether the object to be regulated is "an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment"; if it is, according to the Court, Congress lacks the power under
20 2
Article I to regulate it.

Judicial attitudes towards the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty have long been subject to frequent fluctuation. 20 3 In the early years
of our Constitution, ChiefJustice Marshall articulated a clear vision of federal dominance. 20 4 To him, the Tenth Amendment only reserved to the
states those powers that Congress lacked. 20 5 Thus, the sole question in
201. For a further discussion of Congress' Article I, § 8 spending authority,
see supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
202. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). These concerns
over state sovereignty may well play a lesser role when Congress is acting pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a discussion of federalism and its
effect on state sovereignty, see Caminker, supra note 97, at 1006 n.13. Several cases
also discuss the relationship between state sovereignty and federalism. See, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-56 (1996) (illustrating Supreme Court's
affirmation of Congress' capacity to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it acts under Fourteenth Amendment, even though Congress cannot
abrogate Eleventh Amendment when it acts pursuant to Article I); New York, 505
U.S. at 146 (deciding that protections for state sovereignty under Spending Clause
are analyzed differently).
203. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 779
(1995) (holding that states' power to set qualifications for offices of Congress does
not derive from Tenth Amendment); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-40 (1985) (deciding that Congress did not exceed its
boundaries by providing mass transit authority employees benefits of wage and

hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)). But see
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (concluding that federal firearm
legislation exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority because it does not regulate any economic activity affecting interstate commerce).
204. See generally Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that
federal vessel licensing statute preempted New York's steamboat licensing
scheme); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (recognizing
limits to government power, yet construing Constitution to permit legislature to
exercise its "best judgment" in selecting measures to carry into execution constitutional powers of government).
205. See Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819) ("[I]t was
neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These
powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the sev-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/1

32

Parmet: Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Pr
1999]

STEALTH PREEMPTION

McCulloch v. Marylan 2 0° 6 was whether Article I gave Congress the power to
create a national bank. 20 7 If Congress had the authority, there could be
no claim that the Tenth Amendment left the matter of banking to the
208
states.
During the New Deal, the Supreme Court endorsed the view that congressional power to regulate the private market under the Commerce
Clause was broad and should not be reigned in by notions of "state sovereignty." 20 9 In United States v. Darby,210 the Court noted that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered."2 1 1 Darby's dismissal of the Tenth Amendment and judicial
protection for state sovereignty was never beyond dispute. Although the
post-New Deal Supreme Court was willing to accept the realities required
of a modern market and find congressional commerce power to be farreaching, the Court found the notion that all areas of traditional state
regulatory authority could come under federal control more than a bit
disquieting.2 1 2 After all, federalism, and the dual scheme of governance
provided by the federal system, is at the very heart of our constitutional
system.2 1 3 Surely, there had to be some limits to the erosion of state
authority.
The first post-New Deal case to support the view that the Tenth
Amendment limited federal authority was National League of Cities v.
Usety.2 14 Usery considered the ability of Congress to require states to abide

by the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 1 5 In a surprising opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court, for
eral states; and remain .. .what they were before, except so far as they may be

abridged by that instrument.").
206.
207.
being so
208.
209.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See id. at 325 (finding that only question is whether bank is capable of
connected with government).
See id. at 406 (discussing scope of Congress' authority).
See Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334, 334

(1937) (noting that power of Congress over interstate commerce can neither be
enlarged nor diminished by exercise or nonexercise of state power); United States
v. Bankers' Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935) (noting broad and comprehensive
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce).
210. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
211. Id. .at 123.
212. See id. at 119-26 (discussing scope of federal regulatory authority).
213. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstituionalLaw, 79 VA. L.
REv. 633, 635 (1993) (discussing justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v. United

States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and her analysis of federalism). According to Professor
Powell, the question of where state power ends and federal power begins is our
oldest constitutional question. See id. (analyzing distribution of state and federal
power).

214. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Supreme Court held that Congress lacked the
authority to displace directly states' authority over "traditional government func-

tions, such as fire and police prevention, public health and parks and recreation."
Id. at 855.
215. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
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the first time since the New Deal, ruled that the Tenth Amendment limited Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 2 16 More specifically,
the Court held that under the Tenth Amendment, Congress lacked the
2 17
Acpower to regulate "in areas of traditional governmental functions."
cording to Justice Rehnquist, the Tenth Amendment served as a limit or
trump on congressional power under Article I.
Usery's revival of the Tenth Amendment and state autonomy was subjected to scathing criticism. 218 The critique was eventually adopted by the
majority when it overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.2 19 Before overruling Usery, however, the Court struggled
to apply its precedent and determine what constituted areas of traditional
governmental functions. The cases in which the Court applied Usery shed
some important light on how the current Court would view an attempt by
220
Congress to regulate state court procedures.
The difficulty the courts had in applying Usery and determining what
constitutes a "traditional state function" led the Court to suspect that the
answer may be gleaned more acutely not by looking to the object of the
state or federal regulation at issue, but rather at the way in which the federal regulation affected the manner in which the state went about its regu216. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43 (expressing view that Tenth Amendment
"declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system") (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
217. Id. at 852.
218. See D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779,
782 (1982) (noting that Usery abandoned status quo, which assumed there were
only political checks on Congress' power). Usery was viewed as an "open invitation
to litigation" because it provided no guidelines as to what constituted the boundaries of state autonomy. See id. at 786; see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82
MINN. L. REv. 317, 378 (1997) (arguing that federalism, not state autonomy,
should be valued more in our society because federal system advances ideals that
are important); David S. Gehrig, The Gun-Free School Zones Act: The ShootouteOver
Legislative Finding, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
179, 193 (1994) (supporting Tenth Amendment arguments and contention that
state sovereignty can be found).
219. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
220. See id. at 544-46. In rejecting Usery's rule of identifying traditional state
functions, the GarciaCourt noted several cases as examples of the difficulty a modern-day court would face in establishing what constitutes a traditional government
function. SeeNewYork v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (concluding that
distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was untenable
and must be abandoned). Compare Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 (determining that maintenance of public parks and recreation is traditional government function), with
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-68 (1955) (finding taking of
private property for public use "novel exercise of legislative power"), and Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911) (declaring that provision of municipal
water supply "is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State"), rev'd
sub nom. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1937) (rejecting earlier
position and deciding that provision of municipal water supply was immune from
federal taxation as essential governmental function).
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latory business. 22 ' The early inklings of this view, which has been called
the "autonomy of process principle," appeared in FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi.22 2 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission involved
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,223 a statute which re-

quired that state utility regulatory commissions consider adopting federally suggested standards and which established federal procedural
requirements for state utility commissions to follow when regulating elec22 4
trical rates.
Although the Court ultimately held that the act did not violate the
Tenth Amendment, the Court was clearly troubled. 225 In his majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun looked back to Testa and noted that under its
holding, state courts can be forced to observe federal policy.2 2 6 As a re-

sult, Justice Blackmun believed that state administrative agencies could be
similarly compelled. 227 Justice Blackmun further noted that while the
act's procedural provisions appear more intrusive than its other provisions, there is nothing unconstitutional about a requirement that a state
administrative body follow certain "procedural minima" as it undertakes to
apply the federal law's substantive provisions. 2 28 In making this observation, Justice Blackmun was careful to point out that the act's procedural
requirements did not "purport to set standards to be followed in all areas
of the state commission's endeavors." 229 In essence, the procedural requirements were limited, as they have always been under the Dice doctrine,
to procedures applicable to the resolution of federal substantive issues. 2 30
221. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-51 (finding great difficulty in identifying principled constitutional limitations on scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers
over states merely by relying on "a priori" definitions of state sovereignty and deciding that boundary of state sovereignty lies within political process of federal
government).
222. 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982); see Powell, supra note 213, at 651. As articulated by Justice O'Connor in New York v. United States, federalism protects the integrity of state processes rather than being concerned with "creating a substantive
realm of state legislative autonomy." Id. at 650.
223. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2810 (1994).
224. See id. §§ 2621-2623 (establishing federal procedural requirements for
state utility commissions).
225. See FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 778 (disputing role that
Tenth Amendment plays in limiting state sovereignty).
226. See id. at 760 (" [S] tate courts have a unique role in enforcing the federal
body of law."); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (holding that state courts
must enforce claims decided in state courts of general jurisdiction involving federal law).
227. See FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 761 n.24 (noting that role
of modem federal examiner or administrative law judge is "functionally comparable" to that ofjudge) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 518 (1978)).
228. See id. at 771 (commenting on states' obligation to enforce federal law).
229. Id.
230. For a further discussion of the Dice doctrine, see supra notes 111-48 and
accompanying text.
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Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, voiced even
greater reservations about the act's procedural provisions. 23 1 Justice Powell quoted one commentator's observation that "'[t]he general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial
procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' "232
Justice Powell continued by adding, "I know of no other attempt by the
Federal Government to supplant state-prescribed procedures that in part
23 3
Furthermore, Powdefine the nature of their administrative agencies."
ell noted that if "Congress may... [supplant state-prescribed procedures],
presumably it has the power to preempt state-court rules of civil procedure
and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce." 234 To
Justice Powell this was clearly unconstitutional. 23 5 In finding the unconstitutional procedural provisions to be severable from the rest of the act,
23 6
however, he did not find the entire act unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, was even more emphatic. 237 In an
opinion that foreshadowed her later analysis in New York, she wrote that
"[s] tate legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the
national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which Congress may
assign problems for extended study. Instead, each State is sovereign
within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their gen231. See FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) violates Tenth Amendment because it imposes unprecedented burdens
on states). PURPA intrusively requires states to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration and potential adoption of federally proposed standards because the statute prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that
states must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed standards. See id.
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (commenting on PURPA's impact on state's procedural standards).
232. Id. at 774 (Powell, J,, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Hart, supra note 120, at 508.
233. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that while.
procedural provisions of PURPA may not effect dramatic changes in laws and procedures of some states, if Congress is permitted to do this, Congress may gradually
encroach upon state sovereignty).
234. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Professor
Laurence Tribe who noted that congressional encroachment of this kind presents
danger "that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell").
235. See id. at 775 (Powell,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that only provisions of PURPA discussed are unconstitutional). Justice Powell
finds PURPA's effect upon state administrative and judicial procedure to be unconstitutional. See id.
236. See id. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I limit this
dissent to the provisions of the PURPA identified above . . .[and] to the extent
that the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and reverse
in part.").
237. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Titles I
and III of PURPA conscript state utility commission into the national bureaucratic
army.").
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eral welfare." 238 To Justice O'Connor, the act's defect was not that Congress had regulated a subject matter outside of federal purview; rather,'the
problem was the way Congress went about doing so. 23 9 Instead of directly
regulating utilities on its own, Congress conscripted state agencies to carry
out the federal mandate, thereby impermissibly impairing the ability of
states to function as separate sovereigns. 2 40 Although Justice O'Connor
agreed that Congress could regulate and indeed fully preempt the field of
utility regulation, she believed Congress could not achieve its regulatory
ends through a process that required state agencies to carry out the fed2 41
eral object.
Justice O'Connor found Congress' "commandeering" of the states
troubling for two interrelated reasons. First, commandeering would impose substantial costs on the states. She noted that the act would tax the
"limited resources of these commissions ... decreasing their ability to address local regulatory ills." 242 This intrusion could not be justified by the
Testa doctrine, which merely required courts of general jurisdiction to
treat federal claims evenhandedly.2 43 A requirement that state commissions consider matters that would not otherwise be on their agenda and
apply federal procedures beyond those that they would otherwise apply far
exceeded what Testa authorized.
Second, and more importantly, by requiring state agencies to implement federal law, the act, according to Justice O'Connor, threatened to
disrupt the ability of state citizens to hold state officers accountable for
their actions. 244 She suggested that Congress' heavy intrusion into the
workings of a state administrative agency blurred the lines of authority and
238. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part.
239. See id. at 787 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he states might well prefer that Congress simply impose the standards
described in PURPA; this, at least, would leave them free to exercise their power in
other areas").
240. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining

that because Congress has not preempted regulation of this issue in PURPA, states
cannot devote their resources elsewhere). PURPA "drains the inventive energy of
state governmental bodies by requiring them to weigh its detained standards, enter
written findings, and defend their determinations in state court... [thus] state
utility commissions are less able to pursue local proposals for conserving gas and
electric power." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
241. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that
state agencies have obligations to follow "congressionally mandated tasks" that inhibit these agencies from fulfilling their goals).
242. Id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
243. For a further discussion of Testa, see supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
244. See FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that compelling state agencies to follow federal mandates leads to confusion of responsibility for political
representatives).
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responsibility that help keep each division of government accountable to
245
its own constituents.
These concerns reappeared ten years later injustice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York, which analyzed the constitutionality of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,246 requiring

states, among other things, either to provide for the disposal of low-level
waste or take title to such waste. 247 While not specifically overruling Garcia,Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York reasserted the Court's role in
policing the boundaries of federalism. 248 Determining whether that role
derived from the Tenth Amendment or from limitations implicit within
Article I, Justice O'Connor suggested, was besides the point because the
two constitutional provisions must be read in tandem. 249 What is essential, according to Justice O'Connor, is the realization that "'[t] he States
unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority...
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original
250
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government."'
245. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Testifying
before the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in March 1980,
Daniel Elazar suggested that national officials tend to force state governments to
administer unpopular programs, thus transferring political liability for those programs to the states. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMIC OF GROWTH, HEARINGS
ON THE FEDERAL ROLE 32 (1980) (commenting on administration of federal

programs).
246. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1994)).

247. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (detailing requirements of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985). The
take-title provision read that if a state or regional compact fails to comply with the
statute by January 1, 1993:
[E]ach State in which such waste is generated, upon the request of the
generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, shall be
obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of that State to take possession of the waste ....
99 Stat. 1842.
248. See New York, 505 U.S. at 187 (outlining Court's role in policing contours
of federalism). "Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form
of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form." Id.
249. See id. at 156-57 (discussing Court's role within Tenth Amendment and
Article I); see also Powell, supra note 213, at 650 (explaining that Tenth Amendment directs determination of whether incident of state sovereignty is protected by

limitation on Article I power). Professor Powell suggests that Justice O'Connor
does not read the Tenth Amendment as a trump on Article I powers, as did the
majority in Garcia, but rather as a "rule of construction" directing the Court to
construe the Constitution so as to preserve the ability of states to engage independently in their own lawmaking processes. See id.
250. New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
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The Court's opinion in New York did not resurrect the analysis supplied in Usery.25 1 Instead, Justice O'Connor's opinion more closely
echoed her own dissent in FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, where she
suggested that the essential inquiry is not whether the federal regulation
at issue impinges upon a matter traditionally regulated by a state, but
whether the federal regulation impermissibly undermined "an incident of
state sovereignty." 25 2 More precisely, Justice O'Connor interpreted the
question before her as whether Congress had the power under Article I to
"commandeer" the legislature of the state and require it to enact legisla253
tion in accordance with congressional dictates.
Reviewing the history of the Constitutional Convention, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Framers never intended that Congress
wield such power. 254 According to Justice O'Connor, when the Framers
granted Congress the power to regulate individuals directly and bypass
states, a power that Congress had lacked under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers implicitly denied Congress the power to affect individuals by indirectly coercing their state legislatures. 255 Justice O'Connor
stated that allowing Congress to act upon individuals through the states
would undermine federalism and weaken the accountability through
which citizens can control the actions of both the state and federal legislatures. 2 56 Hence, Justice O'Connor suggested, while Congress may pre251. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis in Usery, see supra notes
214-17 and accompanying text.
252. See New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (discussing limitations contained in Constitution that constrain Congress' exercise of its conferred powers).
253. See id. at 161-62 ("This litigation ... concerns the circumstances under
which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether
Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular
'field or a particular way.").
254. See id. at 163-66 (detailing plans debated at Constitutional Convention).
The Framers debated whether to adopt a Constitution that would exercise federal
legislative authority over individuals or over States. See id. at 165. The Articles of
Confederation demonstrated the ineptitude of a central government legislating
over States because it lacked the authority to make law binding upon individuals.
See id. at 166.
255. See id. at 164-66 (noting that Court has consistently respected choice of
Framers to draft Constitution that cannot compel states to require or prohibit certain acts as passed by Congress). This reading of the history has been subjected to
substantial criticism. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 97, at 1042-49; Richard E. Levy,
New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and
Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 493, 493 (1993)
(stating that opinion in Usery relied on "distorted reading of precedent and Framers' intent to support a sweeping and absolute rule against legislation compelling
states to implement federal policy"); Powell, supra note 213, at 663-67 (discussing
intent of Framers in light of judicial interpretation); Prakash, supra note 70, at
1962-2028 (same).
256. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67, 182-83 (stating that allowing Congress to
control individuals through federal law relieves state officials from responsibility
for restrictive legislation). Of course, Justice O'Connor recognized that Congress
can reach individuals through the state legislatures when Congress acts under the
Spending Clause. See id. at 185. Although Justice O'Connor suggested that states
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empt state laws or directly regulate particular matters in interstate
commerce, Congress must respect the ability of states to enact independently their own laws and cannot command states legislatures to legislate
25 7
in accordance with congressional dictates.
The "no-commandeering" doctrine of New York was recently relied
upon and expanded by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Printz v.
United States.2 5 8 In Printz, the Court found the Brady Handgun Violence

Prevention Act 259 unconstitutional insofar as provisions imposed requirements on "chief law enforcement officers" ("CLEOS") to conduct background checks on would-be handgun purchasers. 2 60 In an opinion that
retain a "choice" when Congress acts pursuant to the Spending Clause, she did not
adequately deal with the accountability and blurring of line problems that may
nevertheless result from states passing laws to receive federal money. See id. Indeed, while it is possible to hypothesize (and all Justice O'Connor's political theories are merely hypotheses) that state voters will be able to discern the correct lines
of authority when states choose to accept federal money, she did not consider the
more daunting problem of whether Congress itself can be held sufficiently accountable for its actions when it acts by giving states money.
257. See id. at 188. A related concern for the ability of states to exist as independent sovereign entities was articulated in Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, with which Justice O'Connor joined, in United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 849 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In arguing that a state
constitutional amendment to limit the terms of U.S. Representatives and Senators
was constitutional, Justice Thomas relied upon the Tenth Amendment and the
belief that the Amendment affirmed that states exist as separate sovereigns and
can assert all sovereign powers not explicitly granted to Congress. See id. at 848-50
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that states are not mere political subdivisions of
United States and that Constitution leaves to states residuary and inviolable sovereignty within terms of Tenth Amendment). The majority disagreed, finding both
that Congress has authority to regulate congressional qualifications and that the
Tenth Amendment cannot reserve to the states a power to regulate the terms of
federal officers because the states did not have any such powers prior to the ratification of the Constitution. See id. at 800-80 (taking narrow approach to scope and
interpretation of Constitution on states' powers).
258. 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997).
259. Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ 101-106, 107 Stat. 1536, 1536-44 (1993) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994)).
260. See Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2387-2404 (holding that background check requirement for purchase of handguns imposed unconstitutional obligation on state
officials to execute federal law). Justice Stevens, who was joined by justices Souter,
Ginsberg and Breyer, cited both the FederalistPapers and the practices of the early
republic as strongly supporting the view that the Constitution permits the federal
government to commandeer state executives, as opposed to legislative, officials.
See id. at 2387-2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also rebutted the majority's insistence that strict judicial oversight of federalism is necessary to protect
state autonomy and individual rights. See id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Breyer also wrote dissents. See id. at 2401-05 (Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Souter focused on his interpretation of The Federalist Papers
Nos. 27, 36, 44 and 45, which he believed demonstrated that state officials were

obliged to support federal law. See id. at 2401, 2403 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, focused on the practical benefits of the federal
government's relying upon state officials to carry out federal programs. See id. at
2402, 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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relied heavily on the history of the Constitution's framing and the early
practices under the Constitution, Justice Scalia found that the Constitution prohibited Congress from commandeering state executive
officials.

26 1

Taken together, New York and Printz can be read to suggest that the
federalization of state court procedures applicable to the adjudication of
state law issues is problematic. To the extent that such schemes require
state legislatures, which in some states enact the procedural rules applicable in the state courts, to alter their rules of civil procedure, those schemes
directly violate New York's edict against the commandeering of state legislation. 262 But even if the proposal is merely characterized as a command
upon state judges, prohibiting them from exercising certain procedural
options, the proposal may still violate the principle established in New York
and Printz that requires Congress to leave state processes autonomous.
The application of the no-commandeering principle to federal laws
affecting state court procedures is complicated by the existence of Testa.
The Court, in both New York and Printz, had to deal with the fact that Testa
and its progeny could be interpreted as supporting congressional commandeering of state courts. 263 Moreover, Justice Scalia in Printz, while reviewing whether Congress may commandeer state executive officials,
considered the fact that the early Congresses required state courts to engage in a variety of federal ministerial activities. 264 The opinions in both
cases acknowledge a history of federal intrusion into the state courts and
these cases may be read to suggest that the federalism limitations they establish upon the commandeering of state legislatures and executive officials do not necessarily apply to the commandeering of the state courts.
Although such an interpretation is possible, there are many reasons to
believe that the current Supreme Court would be deeply troubled by the
type of federal regulation of state court procedures suggested by the proposed tobacco settlement and other recently proposed bills.

261. See id. at 2376 (discussing forced participation of state executive officials
in administration of federal programs).
262. See Charles Allen Wright, ProceduralReform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1
GA. L. REv. 563, 565 (1967) (commenting on need for legal reform due to new
societal developments that call for judicial and legislative adaptations). In some
states, the legislature enacts the procedural code applicable in state courts. See id.
More often, the legislature delegates this power to the courts themselves. See id.
263. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 n.1, 2381 (discussing Second Employers'
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178
(1992) (discussing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and related cases).
264. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370-71. Other commentators have reviewed the
early use of state courts to perform federal ministerial activities. See Caminker,
supra note 97, at 1044 (noting that in these efforts, state courts were required to
implement federal laws, and therefore these actions do not provide precedent for
federalization of state court procedures applicable to state law claims).
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State Sovereignty and the State Court Procedures

The Supreme Court's recent forays into federalism must be read in
light of a history that is both complex and contradictory. Neither clear
lines nor simple rules can be relied upon. This is especially true with respect to judicial federalism. Here the murky questions of federalism become the most opaque. Still, if recent cases suggest anything beyond their
own narrow holdings, it is that the current Supreme Court is adamant on
protecting some "core" of state sovereignty and that the existence of that
core is determined not so much by a search for whether the particular
area of the economy regulated was one traditionally regulated by the
states, but rather by the Court's understanding of the political theory of
federalism and the role that federalism plays in dispersing power and protecting liberty.26 5 Also critical to some members of the Court are the principles of federalism held by key members of the framing generation. 266 As
understood by the current Court, the Framers' federalism does not emphasize the nationalizing concerns of the Framers who designed and advocated for a far stronger central government than did their anti-Federalist
opponents, but rather emphasizes the Framers' republican concerns with
26 7
liberty.
Under this perspective, Federalist No. 10 becomes key to understanding the constitutionally appropriate structure of contemporary federalstate relations. 268 States must be protected as separate political entities so
265. See New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (stating that "[s]tate sovereignty is not just
an end of itself: 'Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power'" (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
759 (1991) (Blackmun,J., dissenting))); see also United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 799-800 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that
states do not have power to impose congressional qualifications additional to those
specifically stated in Constitution); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (demonstrating abandoned process of searching to see if
particular area of economy was one traditionally regulated by states). For a critique of the balance of federal and state power, see Caminker, supra note 97, at
1085-88.
266. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372-73 (discussing enactments of early Congress
that prohibited federal government from commandeering state legislatures); see
also New York, 505 U.S. at 180-82 (explaining constitutional division between federal and state governments).
267. See Martin H. Redish, Doing It With Mirrors: New York v. United States
and ConstitutionalLimitations on FederalPower to Require State Legislation,21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 593, 602-03 (1994) (discussing Guarantee Clause, expressly avoided
by Justice O'Connor in New York, which "could conceivably be construed to provide some sort of protection of state government integrity against Federal incursion"); see also Powell, supra note 213, at 652-63. For a critique of Justice
O'Connor's ruling in New York, see supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
268. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (discussing relationship between state and federal governments). From
this perspective, what is critical about Federalist No. 10 is not its emphasis on the
values of an expanded republic per se, but rather its emphasis on the importance
of countervailing factions and power. See id. Hence, the relationship between the
federal government and the states, as envisioned by the current Supreme Court, is
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that they can serve as countervailing sources of power and reservoirs of
liberty.269 As Justice Blackmun stated, "federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."270 Thus,
although the Court has not endorsed one commentator's suggestion that
federalism can be best understood and protected by a renewed focus upon
the Guarantee Clause, the Court has integrated some of that Clause's concerns into judicial interpretations of Article I and the Tenth Amendment. 271

The

Court has

determined

that

while

the breadth

of

congressional power to regulate the market is great, neither Article I nor
the Tenth Amendment will be read to permit Congress to undermine the
ability of the states to act as separate political entities that can determine
their own laws and carry out their own policies. Instead, the Court suggests that the ability of the states to survive as separate sources of governmental power-to develop and to implement checks upon the federal
authority-requires that the states be able to create and carry out their
own policies. 2 72 To do so, state officials, including legislative, executive
and judicial officials, must remain accountable to their constituents for
their policies. 273 Ultimately, what is critical is whether the sovereign that
initiates the regulation is the one that is responsible for, and hence accountable for, its implementation. 274 According to the Court, if that identity between the sovereign that formulates policy and the sovereign that
implements policy is lacking, lines of authority and accountability will be
confused. 2 75 In addition, both the states and the federal government will
lose their ability to survive as separate sources of policy formulation, as
276
well as political power.
similar to that which Madison believed would be played between the states themselves. See id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349-52 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing need for countervailing powers or separation of powers within federal government).
269. See New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (discussing "fundamental purpose served by

our Government's federal structure"); see also Tom Stacy, Whose Interest Does Federalism Protect?, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1185, 1187-1207 (1997) (arguing that federalism

properly understood does not aim at perfecting liberty).
270. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (discussing principles
of federalism).
271. See Merritt, Federalism, supra note 59, at 2, 78 (stating that Guarantee

Clause restrains federal government from interfering with state autonomy).
272. See Powell, supranote 213, at 686 (stressing need for "initiation" and "immunity" in local governments). Professor Powell has suggested that Justice
O'Connor's approach protects "a space for local agendas, local deliberation, and
local decision making," which he sees as important to creating or protecting "a
tradition of engaged, participatory politics." Id. at 688.
273. See id. at 641-42 (explaining reasons why lines of political accountability
must be clear).
274. See id. (separating implementation and regulating functions within sovereignty concept of government).
275. See id.
276. See id. at 641-50.
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The application of this vision to the federal regulation of state courts
is necessarily made more complex due to the existence of the judges'
clause commanding state judges to follow and apply federal law. 277 As a
result, one cannot simply say that state courts cannot be "commandeered"
in the sense that they cannot be compelled to apply federal law. Moreover, state judges can be required both to accept jurisdiction over federal
claims and to apply federal procedures in regard to the resolution of such
claims. 278 This means that the blurring of lines of authority and political
accountability, which Justice O'Connor worries about, is to some extent
unavoidable when it comes to the judiciary. 2 79 The fact that it may be
impossible to keep state courts as isolated from congressional control as
are other branches of state government, however, does not mean that all
congressional intrusions are permissible. Nor does it mean that the concerns animating the doctrine have no application to the congressional regulation of state court procedures. To the contrary, it seems inconceivable
277. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 340 (1816) (stating that state
court judges are bound to follow Constitution, laws and treaties of United States).
But see Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (declaring that state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction). Justice Scalia's attempt in Printz
to distinguish the obligations of state judges from state executive officials is not

fully convincing. After all, state executive officials are also required to abide by
federal law, and when they do not, they may be compelled by a federal court to do
so. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (requiring governor and legislature
to integrate Little Rock schools). What is unique about state court judges is that
under Testa, federal law may impose affirmative obligations upon them, while it
generally only imposes negative prohibitions upon other state officials. See id.
Hence, we can say that federal law only limits state officials, it does not commandeer them. But, as is always the case in the law, the distinction here between affirmative obligations and negative prohibitions is quite a shaky one; it is certainly
questionable whether one can truly say that federal law only operated in the nega-

tive when it required Governor Fortas to integrate the University of Mississippi. See
id. For a discussion of the idea that the Supremacy Clause does not permit special
treatment for state court judges and that Congress can not commandeer them to a
greater degree than it can commandeer state executive officials, see Caminker,
supra note 97, at 1041 (discussing whether Congress may commandeer state officers to implement federal law).
278. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (describing case history that

led to state courts' obligation to try federal matters); see also Dice v. Akron, Canton

& Youngstown R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (stating that claim involving federal
question "is to be determined by federal rather than state law").
279. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787
(1982) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Congressional compulsion of state agencies ... blurs the lines and political accountability and leaves
citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local
needs."). But see Caminker, supra note 97, at 104249 (arguing that originalism

cannot firmly support Court's anticommandeering rule governing state executive
and legislative activity); Prakash, supra note 70, at 1996-2001, 2013-20 (suggesting
Justice O'Connor has drawn wrong lessorb). Both Prakash and Caminker argue

that the Framers would permit Congress to commandeer both state courts and
state executive officials to carry out federal law. See Caminker, supra note 97, at
1042-49; Prakash, supra note 70, at 1996-2001, 2013-20. Neither of their arguments, however, would accept congressional regulation of state procedures in state
court actions, as the proposal would mandate.
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that a Supreme Court, concerned as this one is with preserving the ability
of the states to exist as separate political and sovereign institutions, would
allow such a dramatic federalization of state courts as would have occurred
under the proposed tobacco settlement.
As the existence of Article III demonstrates, the Framers saw courts as
fundamental to the existence and realization of sovereignty. 28 0 In the
Framers' view, a true government had judicial power and, necessarily, its
own courts could exercise that power. This point was so obvious to the
Framers that they scarcely debated whether the United States should have
federal courts. According to one historian, "[that] there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all." 28 1 On the very first day that
the Constitutional Convention engaged in substantive debate, the Committee of the Whole accepted the resolution that a national government
ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislature, Judiciary and
Executive. 282 According to Madison, a few days later the 28Convention
3
voted unanimously that "a national judiciary be established."

280. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521-30
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (examining judiciary department of proposed government). The fact that they believed it essential that the
federal government have a court system does not mean that the Framers believed

it critical that there be lower federal courts, or that all federal matters be adjudicated in federal courts. See id. Indeed, as was noted above, there is strong reason

to believe that the Framers intended that state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over much of the federal judicial business. See id. I merely wish to empha-

size that when envisioning what was necessary for a government to function, the
Framers assumed the necessity of a court system with one court answerable to that
government acting as a final Supreme Court. The question of whether the Framers intended that there be lower federal courts is, of course, a much-debated question and is well beyond the purview of this Article.
281. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTrIUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 79 (1913); seeJACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 19 (1961) (describing Antifederalists' reservations about establishment of federal judiciary). The Antifederalists' opposition did not lie in the belief
that a sovereign government could exist without a court system. See id. Rather,
they were concerned about the composition of the federal judiciary. See id. More
generally, they were concerned that the creation of a fully sovereign federal government would inevitably undermine the sovereignty of the states. See id. at 124.
282. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 30-36 (Max Farrand ed.,
2d ed. 1911) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS] (discussing creation of
branches of federal government).
283. JAMES MADISON, THE MADISON PAPERS CONTAINING DEBATES ON THE CON-

FEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 155 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1859); see STANLEY ELKINS
& ERIc MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 64 (1993) (noting that "amount of

attention and discussion given to judiciary in the Constitutional Convention was
only a fraction of that devoted to the executive and legislative branches"). The
Framers were convinced of the need for a federal court system and for a place to
appeal disputes between the United States and states, or between the states themselves. See id. But the details were left to a later resolution. See id.
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To many of the Framers, one of the major flaws of the Articles of
Confederation was the absence of any federal court system. 28 4 Cataloging
the defects of the confederations that had existed throughout history,
Hamilton wrote in FederalistNo. 15 that:

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to
the ideal of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other
words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no
penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands
which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more
than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may
be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the Courts
and Ministers of Justice, or by military force; ... [i] n an association where the general authority is confined to the collective
bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach of the
laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of
things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor
28 5
would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.

And later, in his preface to a description of the independence afforded to
the federal judiciary in the Constitution, Hamilton wrote, "In unfolding
the defects of the existing confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to
recapitulate the considerations there urged; as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed .... ,,286 Thus, to the Federalists, it was
beyond dispute that sovereign entities had courts. 28 7 If the United States
was to be a nation, it had to have at least a Supreme Court.
If the Framers felt that a judiciary was critical to the sovereignty of the
federal government, it is not surprising that they also assumed that courts
would be critical to the sovereignty of the states. As was noted before, the
Framers assumed that the states would keep their courts and that those
courts would retain all of their preexisting jurisdiction, except to the extent that such jurisdiction had been exclusively delegated to the federal
government. 288 True, the Supremacy Clause itself implies that state courts
284. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (stating that only courts can enforce obedience to law over individuals
and only military force can compel obedience of states).
285. Id. To Hamilton, this does not "deserve the name of government, nor
would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it." Id. at 96.
286. THE FEDERAuST No. 78, supra note 280, at 521.
287. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that courts are necessary both to give "efficacy to constitutional provisions" by overturning state law in "manifest contravention" of Constitution and provide "uniformity in the interpretation of national laws").
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 70, at 553-54 (stating that "the
states will retain all pre-existing authorities, which may not be exclusively delegated
to the federal head; . . . [a]nd ... will retain the jurisdiction they now have").
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could not operate precisely as they had prior to the Constitution's ratification; after that event, state courts had to recognize the predominance of
federal law and could not discriminate against federal interests in exercising their jurisdiction. 289 Still, the state courts were to remain as state
courts, as the states and their respective constitutions and legislatures had
created. This suggests that although the state courts are not immune from
the influences of federal law, indeed they are bound to observe and apply
federal law, there is also a limit on the extent to which Congress and the
federal government may intrude upon and undermine the independence
of the state courts. Justice O'Connor first suggested this view in her dissent in Southland Corp. v. Keating,290 where the question before the Court
was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 291 was applicable in state
courts. 292 Finding that the FAA created a substantive rule of law enacted

under the commerce power, the majority held that it preempted state law
and applied to state courts.2 9 3 In her dissent, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined, Justice O'Connor argued that the FAA was intended purely as
a procedural law to be applied in federal courts. 294 This conclusion was
based in part upon her reading of the FAA's legislative history and in part
upon her understanding of federalism and her belief that "absent specific
direction from Congress the state courts have always been permitted to
29 5
apply their own reasonable procedures when enforcing federal rights."
Thus, seeing the FAA as creating a procedural limitation, Justice
296
O'Connor hesitated before applying it to state courts.
Equally revealing is Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Gregory v.
Ashcroft. 297 The issue in Ashcroft was whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) 29 8 applied to state judges.299 In addressing that
issue, Justice O'Connor reasserted the vision of federalism that she had
previously articulated in her dissent in FederalRegulatory Energy Commission
289. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 341-43 (1816) (arguing that
appellate jurisdiction of United States extends to state tribunals).
290.
291.
292.
293.

465 U.S. 1 (1984).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
See Southland, 465 U.S. at 7-8.
See id. at 12-14 (addressing Congress' intent to make FAA enforceable in

state courts).
294. See id. at 21-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that FAA is solely procedural and "general federal law" applies in federal courts).
295. Id. at 25-26.
296. For a discussion of the idea thatJustice O'Connor's opinion in Southland
demonstrates that she would disapprove of current attempts to federalize state
court procedure, see Lebow, supra note 65, at 274.
297. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
299. See Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 455 (stating that issue is whether Missouri's
mandatory retirement requirement for judges violated Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
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and would later develop further in New York. 3 0 0 She began with the pieties
of federalism: "As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a
system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." 30 1 This federalism, she suggested, provides for a "check on abuses
of government power." 30 2 She argued that to preserve this federalism, the
Court must not be quick to assume that Congress has chosen to under30 3
mine the sovereignty of the states.
Justice O'Connor then explained how a federal law that regulated the
qualifications of state court judges could weaken a state's ability to act as a
separate political entity. 30 4 "Through the structure of its government, and
the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines
itself as a sovereign." 30 5 According to the Justice, "the authority of the
people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials ... is a power reserved to the States under the
Tenth Amendment [which] . . . 'guarantee[s] to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government.' "306 Although state control over judicial qualifications might be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment or
other constitutional provisions, such limitations should not be lightly inferred. 30 7 Thus, even if Congress had the power under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause to regulate state judicial qualifications, the Court should not read the statute as having that impact without
Congress' explicit directions to do so.308
Therefore, Ashcroft suggests, without conclusively deciding, that a majority of the current Supreme Court Justices believe that, not withstanding
the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution's concerns for state sovereignty
limit the extent to which Congress may regulate state courts. 309 A propo300. See id. at 456-57; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152
(1992).
301. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 457.
302. Id. at 458.
is incumbent upon federal courts to be
303. See id. at 460 (stating that "'it
certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance'"
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 463 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984)).
307. See id. (defining scope of state control under Fourteenth Amendment).
308. See id. at 468-69 (stating that Congress did not intend to impose
mandatory obligations on states pursuant to Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment).
309. See id. at 457-64. Because Justice O'Connor decided the issue as a matter
of statutory interpretation, she did not have to decide whether a federal statute
regulating the qualifications of state court judges would be constitutional. See id. at
477 (White & Stevens, 1J., dissenting in part) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's
consideration of federalism contradicted Garcia,which renounced job of policing
boundaries between states and federal government). Justice Blackmun dissented
in the case, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall. See id. at 486 (Blackmun &
Marshall, 1J., dissenting) (stating that statute did apply to state judges and was constitutional). Interestingly, three of the four members of the Court who disagreed
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nent of the proposed tobacco settlement or of other attempts to federalize
state court procedures may nevertheless argue that Ashcroft is not dispositive. Not only did the Ashcroft Court avoid the constitutional issue, but the
Court dealt with judicial qualifications rather than the regulation of state
court procedures. 310 Such a proponent may suggest that the Tenth
Amendment is concerned primarily with state officials and the right of the
people of a state to choose their officials and that Congress may have more
3 11
leeway to regulate state court procedures.
The distinction between state court officials and state court procedures, however, should not be determinative. Imagine for a moment this
absurd hypothetical: Congress passes a law requiring state judges to ignore
enactments of state legislatures whenever state judges are deciding a case
concerning any issue that substantially affects interstate commerce. If the
hypothetical law is analyzed only by asking whether Congress has regulated a matter that is within the bounds of Article I, the hypothetical would
seem to satisfy the requirement.3 12 If one follows the edict of New York,
however, and decides the Article I issue in light of the Tenth Amendment
and a concern for state sovereignty, the analysis would be quite different. 313 Under the New York approach, one would also have to wonder how
the hypothetical act would affect the ability of states to set their own laws
in accordance with the demands of the Constitution, and to constitute
their own courts as entities entrusted to interpret, apply and ultimately
3 14
compel obedience to constitutionally lawful acts of the state legislature.
From this perspective, one can see that the hypothetical federal law would
with Justice O'Connor's views about federalism were the same Justices who dissented the next term in New York. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188213 (1992) (reporting that Justices Blackmun, Stevens and White dissented). Of
the four justices that dissented in Ashcrofl, only Justice Stevens remains on the
Court.
310. See Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 461-63 (stating that Equal Protection Clause analysis will not be applied to states' power to establish state official qualifications because that power lies "firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives").
311. See id. at 462-63 (discussing "political function" doctrine that has been
used to determine application of Equal Protection Clause to qualifications required of state government officials); see also United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing importance of states having control over qualifications of state officials).
312. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (reducing degree of
deference that Court will accord Congress in determining whether matter "substantially affects" commerce and thus may be regulated by Congress pursuant to
Article I).
313. For a further discussion of the edict of New York v. United States, Article I
under the Tenth Amendment and states' sovereignty, see supra notes 201-11 and
accompanying text.
314. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State . . . ."); see
also Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1874) (limiting
Supreme Court's review of state court's decision to federal issues). In essence, the
hypothetical law would undermine the teachings of Murdock and Erie, both of
which proclaim that states and state courts are the final arbiters of state law. See
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erode the lawmaking and law-applying capacity of states as much as, if not
far more than, any federal regulation of state judges. Moreover, the hypothetical law would affect the political accountability concerns articulated
in New York. In effect, Congress would have prevented state laws from being enforced without clearly accepting the onus for that nonenforcement
by more forthrightly preempting state laws. Political and legal chaos
would result. Voters concerned about the substance of particular laws
would have no idea to what or to whom to turn. And so, while ostensibly
engaging in a narrower preemption than one that created substantive federal law, Congress would have undermined the ability of the electorate,
both state and federal, to hold their lawmakers accountable. Thus, asJustice O'Connor suggests in New York, innovations in federalism that appear
to impose only minor intrusions upon the interests of states may well severely undermine the individual and democratic interests served by
3 15
federalism.
The proposed tobacco settlement and similar bills would not have
gone as far in subverting the ability of states to enforce their own laws as
would the above hypothetical statute. The settlement proposal would not
have entirely disrupted the workings of state courts, but, if enacted, would
have created many of the same difficulties and, possibly, some additional
3 16
ones.
First, the proposal would have imposed significant costs on state
courts. For example, the recent class action brought by smokers in Florida
for the damages they claimed were caused by smoking may include as
many as 100,000-200,000 individuals. 3 17 Even if only a fraction of those
No. 15, supra note 284, at 90 (examining "insufficiency of the
present confederation to the preservation of the Union").
315. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (discussing
problems state and federal governments may have in regulating states due to confusion over accountability).
316. See generally Proposed Resolution Passes ConstitutionalMuster, ACS Says, ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP., Nov. 28, 1997, at 16761 (discussing constitutional issues that may result from proposal). It could be argued that in the case of
the tobacco proposal, at least, the consent of the states to the settlement would
vitiate any Tenth Amendment concerns. See Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American
Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International Environmental Assistance, 22
HARv. ENVrL. L. Rxv. 1, 31 (1998) (discussing effect of states' consent to federal
regulations). The proposal, however, would have applied even to those states that
were not parties to the settlement. Moreover, it is questionable whether the consent of the Attorney General of a state can waive the interests of the state. In the
Eleventh Amendment context, at least, the Supreme Court has required state legislative action to effect a waiver of a state's rights. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that failure of state attorney general to raise sovereign immunity defense does not waive defense); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 18083 (stating that federalism was designed to protect rights of individuals, not state
itself, and support of state officials for law struck down was not sufficient to save it
from constitutional invalidation).
317. See Barry Meier, Trial to Begin in Big Law Suit &y Smoker in Florida,N.Y.
TiMES, July 6, 1998, at A5 [hereinafter Meier, Big Law Suit] (discussing start of
large class action suit in Florida). An earlier class action brought by 60,000 flight
THE FEDERALIST
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potential plaintiffs chose to pursue litigation and were entitled to relief
under the law of a particular state, the inability of the state court to certify
a class action, or at least consolidate some cases where it would be otherwise constitutionally permissible to do so, would obviously impose substantial costs on the state court system.3 18 Estimates show that lack of
consolidation and class actions may cost court systems millions of dollars
each year.3 19 As a result, most scholars who have studied the problems
posed by mass torts have advocated reforms designed to facilitate consolidation and the use of class actions. 3 20 The proposed tobacco settlement
marched in quite the opposite direction. By so doing, it ignored the economic burdens placed upon the states. These burdens may well have been
so enormous as to constitute an undue hardship on state courts, which
Congress may not be able to impose under Testa even when such costs are
321
incidental to the adjudication of federal claims in state courts.
attendants was settled. See id. (noting that victories against tobacco companies are
rare).
318. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2234 (1997) (interpreting class actions as being consistent with Article III and Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1994)). There are constitutional due process limitations on
class actions. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 86-91 (1997) (discussing due
process requirements in class actions). The demands of due process may also impose costs, both political and financial, on state court systems, but they are obviously permissible as the costs necessary for respecting constitutional rights. See
Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2251 (noting terms of settlement reflect allocation
decisions designed to confine compensation and limit defendant liability). The
issue raised here is the extent to which Congress may impose burdens on state
court systems that exceed those necessary for the protection of constitutional commands. See id. at 2244 (noting procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right"); see alsoJohn McCain, Watch the Tobacco-Settlement Costs Skyrocket
Now, Hous. CHRON., June 25, 1998, at 27 (noting how time and expense involved
in litigation are considerably greater at state level).

319. See COMPLEX

LITIGATION,

supra note 53, at 17 (discussing economic costs

of class actions). This is why most scholars who have studied the issue have recommended changes to enhance the use of class actions. See id. (noting that consolidation of complex litigation could save billions of dollars). The proposal thus goes
against the grain of most recommendations designed to deal with inefficiencies in
the court system. See id. (noting that estimated cost of asbestos litigation alone is
over $1 billion).
320. See id. at 16-17. Scholars have cited various defects in the current system,
including duplication of litigation, judicial overload, delay of just decisions, enormous cost and inflated attorneys' fees. See id. (discussing drawbacks of current
system); see also D. HENSLER, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE
STATIsTIcs 33 (1987) (discussing judicial delay and costs).
321. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 386 (1929)
(discussing interaction of state and federal law). Thus, it must be remembered
that the Testa doctrine prohibits state courts from discriminating against federal
claims. See id. at 379 (noting that principle of comity "has no application to present action under constitutional form of government"). To avoid this discrimination, states may inevitably have to bear some costs. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
391-92 (1947) (asserting obligation of states to enforce federal law). But the
Supreme Court has never said that states must discriminate in favor of federal
claims and bear costs for such claims far in excess of those that would otherwise be
expended for state claims. See Douglas, 279 U.S. at 383 ("Because the exercise of
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But, the financial costs are the least troubling aspect. Far more critical, from the perspective of the Tenth Amendment, are the potential political costs. By imposing enormous financial costs and inevitable delays and
inefficiencies on state courts when they adjudicate issues of state law, the
proposal would have undermined the ability of states to adjudicate and
enforce their own laws. Had the proposal been enacted, the citizens of a
state would have been confused about where the problem lay in their tort
system. If the voters were to witness high judicial costs and a clogging of
state courts, which could impede the resolution of civil and even criminal
matters, should they have blamed the state's tort system or the federally
imposed procedural burdens? Given the federal procedural constraints,
would voters have been able to access accurately proposals for modification of the state's tort law? In other words, if problems resulted from the
federally imposed proposal's inefficiencies, would the political system be
able to determine the cause accurately?
Second, the proposal would have undermined the ability of states to
determine their own law. Federal law may limit or displace state law because that is the natural consequence of the Supremacy Clause, but, in our
constitutional system, states have always been the final arbiters of their
own laws. 3 22 Yet, by imposing such substantial limitations on the ability of
state courts to determine state laws, the proposal would not only have added costs, it would have undoubtedly affected the interpretation and

evolution of state tort law. For example, limiting class actions would alter
the scope of relevance and thus the rules of evidence applicable in state
tobacco litigation. 323 The way state courts would rule on the ultimate substantive issues of state tort law would be affected. Again, the impact of the
federal limitation would not be clear or direct; as such, the changes might
not be readily attributable to the federal government. Instead, the
changes would be subtle and indirect, intermeshed in the fabric of state
common law. Without explicitly exercising its powers of preemption or
jurisdiction would be a burden on interstate commerce, the refusal to exercise'
jurisdiction is at least reasonable, and, therefore, not a violation . . . of the
Constitution.").
322. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI of the United States Constitution
provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.; see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that no federal common law exists and Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 611 (1874) (holding
decision of federal.question by highest state court to be correct).
323. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 151, at 249 ("Relevance is a relational concept and carries meaning only in context. Relevance is determined by
the issues raised by the parties, the other evidence introduced, and the applicable
substantive law.").
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regulation, Congress would have effectively altered the "warp and woof' of
state tort law. As a result, the ability of the states to exist as distinct political entities with their own laws, arising out of their own legislative, political and judicial systems, would be undermined. To a Supreme Court that
is concerned with state sovereignty, such an unprecedented intrusion may
324
well be found to go too far.
G.

The Possibility of Removal

Possibly to avoid the constitutional problems associated with the regulation of state court procedures, the proposed tobacco settlement and the
proposed Securities Reform Act each provided for removal of state tort
actions to federal court in instances where the state court did not follow
the federally imposed procedural limitations.3 25 For example, Title VII,
section B of the proposed tobacco settlement would have allowed the defendants to remove an action to federal court upon the plaintiffs application to a state court for a class action or joinder.3 26 Removal would be
permitted in similar circumstances under House Bill 1689, the proposed
Securities Reform Act.3 27 The question remains whether these removal
provisions would be constitutional and, if so, whether they could extinguish any constitutional infirmity that otherwise pertained to the federal
regulation of state court procedures.
The removal proposals were clearly connected to the federal regulation of state court procedures and must be analyzed as such. Nevertheless,
even if one could ignore the federalism problems raised by the regulation
of state court procedures, constitutional issues would arise with respect to
the removal provisions. 32 8 Under the original proposed tobacco settlement, removal could occur merely upon the motion of a plaintiff to consolidate a claim. 329 Thus, even if a state court was willing to comply with
the federal ban on consolidation and the plaintiff made a motion in a state
court that had no procedure to consolidate claims, the defendant could
have removed the action. Removal in such a circumstance should raise
grave Article III problems because in the absence of diversity, there would
324. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's position on comity, see
infra notes 355-79 and accompanying text.
325. See Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 39 (discussing removal to federal

court by defendant); see also Securities Reform Act, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
326. See Tobacco Proposal,supra note 4, at 39 (discussing generally civil liability
for past conduct). By deeming all tobacco claims to be federal actions, the bill was
able to expand the scope of removal while erasing many of the constitutional
problems. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1998) (expanding scope of removal);
Daynard & Parmet, Working Paper #8, supra note 33, at 1-3 (noting that all civil
liability actions against tobacco companies arise under federal law).
327. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997) (discussing requirements for
removal).
328. For a further discussion of federalism and state court procedures, see
supra notes 201-64 and accompanying text.
329. See Tobacco Proposal, supra note 4, at 39 (discussing removal jurisdiction).
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appear to be no true federal issue. 3 30 In such a case, the basis for Article
III jurisdiction, if any exists, must rest on either the possibility that a hypo33 1
thetical federal issue may arise or the theory of protective jurisdiction.
But as was noted earlier, the Supreme Court has never endorsed the concept of protective jurisdiction. 332 Jurisdiction, therefore, must be based
merely on the possibility of a hypothetical federal claim. Basing jurisdiction on such a thin reed arguably finds some support injustice Marshall's
3 33
dicta in Osborn, but finds little contemporary support.
Even more troubling is the nature of the particular hypothetical issue
upon which this Article IIIjurisdiction must rest. Presumably, the federal
issue that would justify Article III jurisdiction would be the question of
whether consolidation or a class action, suggested by the plaintiff's motion
precipitating the removal, is appropriate. This raises the question of
whether the federal limitation on state court procedures is itself constitutional.3 3 4 Hence, the federal issue that would support Article III removal
jurisdiction would be the potential unconstitutionality of the federal regulation that the removal was attempting to save. Thus, the drafters, worried
that a regulation of state court procedures was unconstitutional, attempted to save the regulation by having the very question of the regulation's constitutionality serve as a foundation for Article IIIjurisdiction and
the divestiture of state court jurisdiction. This boot-strapping is insufficient to save the proposal's regulation of state court procedure. 33 5 In330. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (raising federal question
required for Article III purposes). For a further discussion of the Article III
problems, see supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
331. For a further discussion of Article III jurisdiction, see supra notes 141-45
and accompanying text.
332. For a further discussion of protective jurisdiction, see supra notes 154-83

and accompanying text.
333. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 755-65

(1824) (exploring generally grounds on which jurisdiction may be maintained); see
also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995) (finding sufficient grounds for federal jurisdiction for claim not arising under FTCA though
brought against federal employee acting within scope of employment while
abroad), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 335 (1997). Indeed, the dissent in Gutierrez suggests
that several members of the Court clearly would find grave constitutional problems
with resting Article IIIjurisdiction upon such a thin reed. See id. at 441-44 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting serious problem in requiring federal district court to retain
jurisdiction over claim not implicating federal law). The majority justifies its finding, first, because there was diversity in the case before the Court, and second,
because it found that the jurisdictional issues themselves presented sufficiently
weighty federal issues to justify federal jurisdiction. See id. at 435 (discussing justification of federal jurisdiction). For a further discussion regarding removal and the
basis for federal courts' jurisdiction in the proposed tobacco settlement, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
334. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79 (1803) (stating
that act repugnant to Constitution cannot be sustained as law).
335. For a further discussion of the proposal's insufficient attempt to justify
the regulation of state court procedure, see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of whether the Supreme Court would allow this federalization of state courts, see supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
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deed, the boot-strapping is quite reminiscent of the unconstitutional
choice struck down in New York.33 6 In New York, the state was required
either to "take-title" to the radioactive waste or enact conforming legislation. 33 7 The majority did not view the act's Hobson's choice as a true
choice because Congress could not independently impose either option
on the states.33 8 The combination of unconstitutional options did not
provide any sanctuary. So too here, if the regulation of state court procedures found in the proposed tobacco settlement and Securities Reform
Act would impermissibly undermine the independence of state courts,
then removal provisions that depend upon the constitutionality of that
regulation for its jurisdictional footing cannot save the unconstitutional
regulation. Although the removal provision could prevent the state courts
from having to bear the full cost of the federal regulation, the political
accountability and federalism problems would remain, as would the ineffi339
ciencies caused by the removal of cases during the course of litigation.
The possibility of removal predicated on a potentially unconstitutional intrusion on state judicial independence should not resolve the very constitutional problem upon which it rests.
IV. A Loss oF

COMITY

The argument thus far has contended that proposals to federalize
state court procedures in state tort actions are unconstitutional. Even if
that is not the case, however, the proposals to federalize state court procedures in state tort actions should remain deeply troubling from a federalism perspective. Indeed, our judicial canon is replete with cases that
express the values of "comity" 34° and that caution the federal courts to
respect the integrity and independence of state courts in recognition of
the critical role these courts play under "our federalism."3 41 Although
these cases speak mostly to judicial prudence and not to the actual constitutional limits on congressional authority, they nevertheless should cau336. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-76 (1992) (holding that
regulation regarding disposal of low-level radioactive waste inevitably resulted in
commandeering of states).
337. See id. at 153-54 (discussing take-title provisions of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1994))).
338. See id. at 144 (refuting petitioner's argument that Act imposed this
requirement).
339. For a further discussion of accountability, federalism problems and inefficiencies caused by removal, see supra notes 273-76, 325-38 and accompanying
text.
340. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 722 (1991) (holding that
federal courts may not review state court's denial of federal habeas claim if state
procedural default supports continued custody).
341. SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (holding that federal courts
will not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary
circumstances).
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tion against either the casual federalization of state court procedures or
the questionable removal process attached to such proposals.
Prudential reasons for respecting the independence of state courts
are numerous. 342 To Professor Hart and his successors, respect for the
independence of state courts is essential because state courts are the final
protectors of liberty. 34 3

Congressional control of federal court jurisdic-

tion inevitably limits the extent to which federal courts can serve as protectors of individual or minority rights.3 4 4

Only state courts, with their

independence from Congress, can be ensured to remain open. 34 5 Given
the critical role that state courts will have to play when we need them
most, these scholars suggest treating state courts as true and equal partners to the federal courts in the protection of rights so that state courts
346
will be there when all else fails.

Other scholars suggest that state courts deserve respect because of the
generative role they can play in the evolution and protection of individual
rights. 347 For example, Justice Brennan, who typically endorsed easy ac-

cess to federal courts and clearly chastised state courts for their frequent
constitutional abuses, came later in his career to praise the critical role
state courts and state constitutions can play in the protection of rights. 348
342. For a further discussion of the reasons for protecting the independence
of state courts, see infra notes 343-52 and accompanying text.
343. See generally Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof
the FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953) (cataloguing

discussions on jurisdiction and discussing role of state courts in general scheme of
Constitution, which holds that state courts are primary guarantors of constitutional
rights). See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation,
22 WM. & MARV L. REv. 605, 628-29 (1981) (discussing role of state courts in elaboration of federal constitutional law and enforcement of federal constitutional
principles).
344. See Ara Lovitt, Book Note, ConstitutionalConfusion?,50 STAN. L. REv. 565,
568-69 (1998) (reviewing RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996)) (noting that "observers of Rehnquist
Court have witnessed a*narrowing of federal court jurisdiction").
345. See Hart, supra note 343, at 1401 (discussing general jurisdiction of state
courts).
346. See Bator, supra note 343, at 624-29 (discussing state role in formulation
of federal policy). This view tends to assume that institutions and state court systems behave as individual human beings would. See id. (discussing importance of
state courts' desire to guard and protect Constitution). Ideally, state judges should
consider federal law as part of their own law. See id. at 624. State judges should
feel empowered in a manner that makes them feel that they are on par with the
federal courts. See id. As a result, state courts will feel "an obligation to 'guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution."' Id.
(quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
347. See Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage,Equal Protection, and New JudicialFederalism: A View from the States, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 237, 246 (1996) (noting that
in 1970s and 1980s, Supreme Court became conservative and less protective of
individual rights).
348. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing sovereign immunity and enhancement of liberty); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963) (discussing implications for federal-
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Envisioning federal constitutional rights as a mere floor, Justice Brennan
argued that state courts were best suited to expand the panoply of rights
enjoyed by individuals. 34
Others, perhaps less idealistically, stress the actual role that state
courts play in our legal system. 350 Whatever one thinks of the respective
division of labor between the state and federal courts, the reality is that

state relations in administration of criminal justice), overruled in part by Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)
(expressing view espoused by Justices Douglas and Brennan that prejudice existed
in state law), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The question of whether state or federal courts are more or less protective of constitutional rights is known as the "parity debate." See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U.
L. REv. 609, 609 (1991) [hereinafter Wells, Parity Debate] (noting that parity enters
into "virtually every discussion of rules concerning access to federal court for constitutional claims"). On one side of the issue, advocates of federal courts argue for
broad jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state action. See id. (asserting
that federal courts are better than state courts at adjudicating these controversies).
On the other hand, advocates of state court jurisdiction stress that state courts are
capable of enforcing constitutional rights. See id. at 610 (noting that proper judicial balance is critical issue). Resolution of this debate, if any is possible (and it
probably is not), is beyond the scope of this Article. SeeWilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548-50 (1986) (arguing that state courts can and
should protect individual rights to greater degree than do federal courts). Justice
Brennan noted:
For a decade now, I have felt certain that the Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism should be interpreted
as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach. In the 1960s,
the "understandable enthusiasm that championed the application of the
Bill of Rights to the states . . . contribute[d] to the disparagement of
other rights retained by the people, namely state constitutional rights."
Busy interpreting the onslaught of federal constitutional rulings in state
criminal cases, the state courts fell silent on the subject of their own constitutions. Now, the diminution of federal scrutiny and protection out of
purported deference to the states mandates the assumption of a more
responsible state court role. And state courts have taken seriously their
obligation as coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties.
Id. at 548 (footnote omitted) (quoting Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1, 4 (B. McGraw ed., 1985)).
349. See Brennan, supra note 348, at 550 (stating that rebirth of interest in
state constitutional law should be greeted enthusiastically).
350. See Erwin Chermerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45
U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1996) [hereinafter Chermerinsky, Federalism] (discussing importance of both state and federal courts in ensuring proper allocation of
power between state and federal governments). Professor Chermerinsky made
three points. See id. First, throughout American history, and especially now, federalism has been viewed as concerned with limiting federal power to protect state
governments. See id. at 1220. Second, federalism should instead be viewed as being concerned with the proper allocation of power between state and federal governments. See id. Third and finally, in determining the proper allocation of
power, the goal must be effective government. See id.
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most judicial business occurs in state courts. 351 Far more criminal trials,
and certainly far more cases, are adjudicated in the state courts than in the
federal courts. 352 With that in mind, it is imperative that policymakers
pause before undermining state court systems by imposing humiliations,
inefficiencies and unnecessary costs upon them.
Of course, recognition of the importance of state courts should not
be read to negate the critical role that federal courts have played in our
constitutional system. In many areas, but particularly in the battle against
race discrimination, federal courts have played a dominant role.3 53 There
can also be no doubt that the Constitution permits, and prudence recommends, concentrating federal statutory litigation before federal courts,
thereby permitting the development of judicial expertise and uniformity
of interpretation.3 5 4 In the absence of a clear federal interest, however,
our legal tradition cautions against unnecessary federal interference with
the legitimate functioning of state courts.3
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Doctrines as diverse as the

351. See Judith S. Kaye, "Year in Review" Shows Court of Appeals ContinuingIts

Great Traditions, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 331, 331 (1998) (noting that state courts
determine roughly 98% of nation's litigation).
352. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT

STATISTICS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS

(1995 Supp.) (providing statistical overview of state and federal district court
caseloads). For example, in 1995, 281,681 cases were filed in the federal district
courts, as compared to 33,405,566 cases filed in state trial courts. See id. at 138,
167.
353. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1982) (describing why Reconstruction Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over civil
rights cases); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1120-28
(1977) (arguing for superiority of federal courts). Whether federal courts are indeed more protective of federal civil rights claims is highly debated.. See Erwin
Chermerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciay, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 233, 239-55 (1988) [hereinafter Chermerinsky, ParityReconsidered] (discussing historical debate over state and federal parity); Michael E. Solimine &James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federaland State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
JudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 223-32 (1983) (testing parity debate
between federal and state courts empirically); Wells, Parity Debate, supra note 348,
at 609 (discussing federal-state parity issue).
354. See Neal Miller, An EmpiricalStudy of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal QuestionJurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 371 (1992) (studying forum choices under federal jurisdiction empirically). There are different rationales used to support federal court jurisdiction in cases involving litigants from
different states or predicated upon federal law. See id. at 372. Diversity jurisdiction
is thought to reflect a concern for out of state commercial litigants' fear of local
court bias. See id. Federal question jurisdiction has been used historically to enforce constitutional rights. See id. at 372-73. A second rationale for federal question jurisdiction is the "need for uniform interpretation and application of federal
law and ... the development of a federal common law for federal legislation." Id.
at 373.
355. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (stating that federal
courts will not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances). It should also be noted, however, that there is a counter
tradition, supported by the Reconstruction Amendments and their implementing
legislation, which permits significant federal oversight or interference in the procedures of state courts. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (holding
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abstention doctrine, 35 6 the "adequate and independent state ground doctrine," 35 7 the judicially created exhaustion rule3 58 and procedural default
rules applicable to habeas corpus 359 reflect this reluctance to divest the

state courts of jurisdiction.360 Indeed, what is striking about these doctrines is their genesis and evolution in cases raising clear federal interests.
3 61
Thus, in Younger v. Harris,
for example, the Court emphasized the importance of comity despite the presence of an arguably significant First
that federal judge may not deny habeas corpus to person who bypasses state procedure and forfeits state court remedies), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1960) (noting that federal
remedies are supplementary to state remedies), overruled by Monell v. Department
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This federal involvement, however, has been
predicated on the need to ensure the vindication of federal rights, particularly
federal constitutional rights. For a further discussion of federal involvement to
ensure vindication of federal rights, see supra notes 184-200 and accompanying
text. This justification cannot support the proposal's suggested federalization of
state court procedures, as these procedures are relevant to the adjudication of
state common law, not federal constitutional, claims. See Tobacco Proposa4 supra
note 4, at 2 (empowering federal government to set national standards).
356. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 342-48 (1975) (finding proper
federal jurisdiction); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-54 (finding that federal courts will not
enjoin state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances);
Railroad Comm'n Pullman v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (holding that
issue of unconstitutional discrimination should be withheld pending outcome of
state court proceeding).
357. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983) (discussing adequate and independent state law ground doctrine); see also Murdoch v. City of
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 598-606 (1874) (discussing breadth of federal
jurisdiction).
358. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 255 (1886) (holding that although federal court could exercise habeas corpus to detriment of state, power should not be
exercised before state trial).
359. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91 (holding that absent showing of prejudice, federal habeas corpus action is barred).
360. See Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2224(a)-2244(b) (Supp. 1997) (noting example of recent statutory trends that

reflect federal reluctance to divest state courts of jurisdiction). Of course, where
there are strong federal substantive interests, the balance is quite different. See
Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, TheYounger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction, 55
TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1142 (1977) (stating that restrictions on availability of federal
equitable relief in sensitive areas remain unaffected). Thus, the Reconstruction
era law enlarged the jurisdiction of the federal courts, presumably at the expense
of the state courts, to protect the vital federal interests embedded in the Reconstruction Amendments. See id. (noting that today federal courts protect rights in
sensitive areas, such as segregation and legislative malapportionment). What is
interesting about the doctrines cited above in the text is that they herald the importance of comity even where there are substantive federal interests at stake. For
a further discussion of the importance of comity, see supra notes 340-52 and accompanying text. Presumably, when Congress federalizes a state court procedure
without asserting any substantive federal interest, the need for comity is all the
greater.
361. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Amendment claim. 36 2 Surely comity warrants even greater attention in
the absence of any recognizable federal interest.
A closer review of these various doctrines demonstrates that recent
proposals to federalize state court procedures would offend notions of
comity in several critical ways. 363 First, by confusing the lines of political
authority, these proposals would interfere with the ability of the states to
hold their judges accountable. 364 Even if such a dilution of accountability
does not violate the Constitution, it still would undermine respect for the
state judicial process. The importance of that respect was articulated in
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Michigan v. Long.3 6 5 In Long, the Supreme
Court found appellate jurisdiction over a state court opinion that arguably
rested on an adequate and independent state law ground precisely because the Supreme Court felt that requiring state courts to clarify the basis
for their opinions "will provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to
develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet
will preserve the integrity of federal law." 366 Therefore, the Court believed that respect for state courts required a clarification of the source of
judicial decisions.3 6 7 Only with accountability ensured could an in368
dependent state jurisprudence flourish.
Second, recent proposals to federalize state court procedures would
also gravely interfere with the orderly administration of state courts.
When deciding to review a case, traditionally the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to overlook state procedural defaults. This is true even when the
defaults would prevent adjudication of otherwise meritorious federal constitutional claimsY. 6 9 Federal courts have long recognized that state courts
362. See id. (forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances).
363. For a further discussion of how these proposals offend the principles of
comity, see supra notes 364-71 and accompanying text.
364. For a further discussion of the impact of such proposals on states' ability
to hold their judges accountable, see supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
365. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
366. Id. at 1041.
367. See id. at 1041-42 (discussing necessity of adequate and independent state
law grounds). The Long Court noted that it would not review judgments of state
courts that rest on "adequate and independent state grounds." Id. at 1041. The
Court elaborated that the jurisdictional concern is that "we not render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than
an advisory opinion." Id. at 1042.
368. See id. at 1041 (commenting that state courts must be free from unnecessary federal interpretation of state constitutions).
369. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 412 (1991) (holding state regulation
not adequate and independent so as to bar federal judicial review); see also Michal
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (finding that state criminal code did not present insurmountable barrier to making federal claim). The Supreme Court has, on
occasion, overlooked such defaults where it believes that the state procedural rule
created an undue burden on the vindication of federal rights. See Ford,498 U.S. at
411 (discussing state procedural rule in context of equal protection under Four-
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should have liberty, within the bounds of due process, in setting the procedures to be applied in their own criminal proceedings.3 70 If deference to
state court procedures is justified, even when it bars consideration of a
federal constitutional defense in a capital case, surely a similar deference
is due to state procedures in a state common law case where there is no
371
certainty that there will be any federal substantive issue whatsoever.
The importance of comity to the state courts has also been stressed in
situations, such as those arising under the Younger doctrine, in which parties have asked lower federal courts to enjoin, review or at least secondguess the workings of state courts. 372 For example, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,3 73 Texaco was faced with a huge judgment from a Texas state
court.3

74

Rather than complying with Texas procedure and posting an

appeals bond, Texaco filed an action under Section 1983 in the federal
district court in New York. 375 The Court derided Texaco's attempt to bypass the state and ask the federal court to intervene and, in effect, review
the procedural requirements of a state. 376 The Court stated that federalism mandates that federal courts refrain from acting not only when the
pending state proceedings are criminal, "but also when certain civil proceedings are pending if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
37 7
comity between the States and the National Government."
teenth Amendment). The important point, however, is that in these instances the
state procedural rule was antecedent to federal constitutional defenses. See id. at
418-21 (stating that petitionee's claim could go forward despite procedural errors
at state level); see also Micha, 350 U.S. at 92-93 (discussing whether equal protection race discrimination claims overrode state criminal code's three-day statute of

limitations to raise grand jury objections). No such pressing federal interest can
be claimed with respect to the proposed limitation on class actions and consolidations in state tort actions. See Parmet, Working Paper #3, supra note 21, at 6-9 (discussing proposal's limits on class actions and consolidations).

370. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (noting that requirement that prisoners meet heightened "cause and prejudice" standard before federal courts can review state court criminal proceedings will appropriately
accommodate concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy and channeling of
claims into most appropriate forum).
371. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-57 (1991) (holding that
claims presented for first time in state habeas corpus proceedings are not subject
to review in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
372. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) (stating that federal court may not grant
injunction to state proceedings in state court except as authorized by Congress or
to protect or effectuate its judgments); see also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) ("Proceedings in state courts
should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower
federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and
ultimately this Court.").
373. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
374. See id. at 4, 5 (detailing history of Texaco litigation).
375. See id. at 6, 7 (discussing background of Texaco).
376. See id. at 10-18 (discussing Texaco's filing of Section 1983 action).
377. Id. at 11. To be sure, Younger does not apply whenever there is an ongoing state proceeding. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
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Similar concerns about the propriety of lower federal courts reviewing
3 78
the actions of state courts are evidenced in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
This doctrine suggests that lower federal court review of state court judgments interferes not only with federal-state relations, but with the
Supreme Court's power to review state court judgments under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257.

3 79

The removal provisions set forth in the proposed tobacco settlement
would have violated this "normal" ordering. Under the proposal, a defendant could have removed an action to federal court if the state court
380
granted or considered a motion to join claims or certify a class action.
Even assuming that such a state court ruling would be erroneous under
federal law and that the section's procedural prohibition falls within the
realm of Congress' powers, this provision would have disturbed the nor424 U.S. 800, 817-21 (1976) (discussing contemporaneous exercise of concurrent

jurisdiction by state and federal courts). Younger requires that the state interest be
important and the state proceeding provide an opportunity for review of federal
claims. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 123 F.3d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1997)
(setting standard for important state interest), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
In determining whether the important state interest has been met, the court considers whether the state action concerns the central sovereign functions of state
government such that "exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government." Id. at 106. The Younger
limitations, however, presume the existence of a federal claim. See id. (considering
underlying nature of state proceeding on which federal lawsuit would impinge).
In the absence of a federal claim, a federal defense or diversity, it is difficult to
understand why there should be any limitations on the need for comity.
378. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 48288 (1983) (noting that federal district court has no authority to review final judgments of state court judicial proceedings); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415-16 (1923) (noting that Supreme Court is sole forum for correction of
errors in deciding constitutional questions).
379. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing rationale of Rooker-Feldman doctrine), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1039 (1998). Of course,
habeas corpus can be seen as an exception to this prerogative, as the lower federal
courts in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in effect review the proceedings of the
state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (allowing federal district court to entertain application for writ of habeas corpus from prisoner in custody pursuant to
state court judgment under certain circumstances). Traditionally, habeas corpus
was available only after a petitioner exhausted all of his or her state court remedies. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (announcing "total exhaustion
rule," which requires habeas corpus petitioners to exhaust fully all claims at state
court level), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994). Under the proposal,

there would be no similar exhaustion requirement. See Tobacco Proposal, supranote
4, at 39 (omitting requirement of exhaustion prior to defendant's ability to remove
to federal court). More importantly, the removal and de facto collateral review of
state court procedures would occur despite the lack of any substantive interest, a
point that distinguishes the proposal's removal provision from the review available
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See id. (limiting review to claims that petitioner is held
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States").
380. For a further discussion of the proposal's removal provisions, see supra
notes 325-39 and accompanying text. See Tobacco Proposa supra note 4, at 39
(prohibitingjoinder and class actions and providing for removal to federal court).
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mal relationship between the federal district and state trial courts.3 8 1 By
allowing for removal upon the issuance of the state court's ruling, the proposal would effectively place the federal district courts in the position of
sitting in review of the state trial court's disposition of the motion.
An even more extreme version of this removal scheme appeared in
Senator Hatch's proposed codification of the tobacco settlement.38 2 Section 262(b) (2) of the bill would have allowed any defendant, in any tobacco tort action, to remove any such action to federal court at any time
during the litigation if the defendant "reasonably contends" that the case
was "being conducted in a manner inconsistent with the terms of chapter
1 of subtitle C .... -383 The federal trial court was then obliged to determine whether the state court had violated the procedural demands of the
federal act.3 84 If the federal district court found that the state court violated the federal requirements, the court could have dismissed the action
or issued orders requiring conformity. 385 If the federal district court
found any violation, it could have either remanded the case or retained
jurisdiction if it was "necessary to serve the interests of justice."3 86 In
either case, the federal district court would have been asked not only to
take jurisdiction away from the state courts, but to sit in review of such
courts. These actions by the federal district court would have caused the
state courts needless disruption. More importantly, it would have placed
the lower federal courts in the position properly held by the Supreme
Court-to sit in review of state court judges. It is difficult to imagine a
more direct and disruptive interference with the state courts and a clearer
displacement of the role assigned to the Supreme Court.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fidelity to federalism has always been fickle. Few proponents of
either state autonomy or nationalization have been thoroughly consistent
381. For a further discussion of the relationship between the federal and state
courts, see supra notes 342-62 and accompanying text. Professor Wells has argued
the opposite, claiming that removal helps state courts by reducing their caseload
and is not any more disruptive than settlement. See Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. REV. 59, 83-86 (1981) [hereinafter Wells,
Comity] (noting subtlety of allocation problem).
382. See Placing Restraints on Tobacco's Endangerment of Children and
Teens Act, S. 1530, 105th Cong. (1997) (codifying proposed tobacco settlement).
383. Id. § 262(b) (2). For a further discussion of this provision, see Wendy E.
Parmet, Judicial Federalism and S. 1530, Working Paper #5 in a Series on Legal
Issues in the Proposed Tobacco Settlement (Feb. 17, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Parmet, Working Paper #5].
384. See H.R. 1530, 105th Cong. § 262(e) (1997) (discussing removal and procedural demands of Senate Bill 1530).
385. See id. (discussing remedies available to federal district courts under Senate Bill 1530).
386. Id.
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in their advocacy.38 7 Most individuals, whether they are scholars, judges
or politicians, have altered their positions on federalization when an issue
important enough, or politically expedient enough, counsels for their
3 88
conversion.
Though fidelity to federalism might not be prevalent, or even wise,
respect for our federal system suggests that one pause before adopting
radical alterations to the relationship between the states and federal government. More importantly, an appreciation for the role that the relationship between the states' and federal government plays in preserving
democratic government suggests that deviations from the usual delineation should be well considered.
It is in this regard that the proposals for federalizing state court procedures in tobacco and other tort litigation are most troubling. There
have been endless discussions regarding whether or not Congress should
federalize consumer product laws. Although the soundness of any such
move is open to debate, few would contend that congressional preemption
of state tort law seen in the tobacco proposal touches the boundaries of
389
Congress' Article I power.
The proposals at issue do not call for a clear preemption of state substantive law or a limitation on state actions. Rather, these proposals appear, at first glance, to affect only state judicial procedures and to leave
the bulk of tort law to the states. The authors of these proposals can thus
call themselves "federalists" and can declare that the states remain the font
of consumer products' law.
387. See Powell, supra note 213, at 670 (discussing textual enumeration of federal powers). Professor Powell noted:
The whole history of the Court's use of limiting textual construction between the beginning of extensive congressional legislation and the New
Deal repudiation of the enterprise was marked by rapid swings between
generous and pinched readings of congressional powers. Even a sympathetic observer might well conclude that decisions about the proper
scope and employment of federal powers are so inherently legislative and
policy-driven that even a good-faith judicial attempt to make them inevitably collapses the judicial function into Congress'.
Id. For a further discussion of the inconsistencies that the 104th Congress exhibited on this point, see Gray, supra note 69, at 559, 560 n.2 (noting Court's "schizophrenic" approach toward proper balance between state and federal powers).
388. For a general discussion of the development of federalism, see KERMIT
HALL, FEDERALISM: A NATION OF STATES-MAJOR HIsTORIcAL INTERPRETATIONS Introduction (Kermit Hall ed., 1987). The Framers themselves were not absolutist in
their positions on the subject. See id. at ix (providing background on historical

federalism). Rather than supporting autonomous states or a monolithic federal
government, they created a complex system that gave some powers to the federal
government and left some powers to the states. See id. at x.
389. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating limitations on Commerce Clause powers). It is possible that
Justice Thomas, who appears to take a very narrow view of Congress' Article I powers, might find that Congress lacks such a power. See id. (discussing scope of Congress' powers).
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It is only by looking deeper, at the proposals' more technical provisions, that one can begin to see how they might interfere with the states'
abilities to enforce and make their own laws. The proposals do covertly
what their drafters deny they do overtly. This "stealth preemption" is not
only disingenuous, it is far more disruptive of federal-state relations than
are the traditional forms of preemption. By federalizing state court procedures, in technical and obscure ways, these proposals slyly federalize tort
law without inviting or even permitting public recognition or consideration of what is occurring. If such stealth preemption is constitutional, it
warrants careful consideration and public debate as to its impact on our
federal system.
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